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Since the 1960s, scholars of separatism have debated the impact of regional 
autonomy policies and general democratization measures on the strength of 
secessionist movements in conflict-prone areas. In this heated academic discussion, 
supporters and critics of political decentralization advanced highly divergent 
arguments and case studies. On the one hand, numerous authors have identified 
regional autonomy and expanded democratic rights as effective instruments to settle 
differences between regions with secessionist tendencies and their central 
governments.2 In their view, regional autonomy has the potential to address and 
ultimately eliminate anti-centralist sentiments in local communities by involving them 
more deeply in political decision-making and economic resource distribution. They 
point to cases such as Quebec in Canada, where the support for the separatist Parti 
Quebecois dropped from almost 50 percent in 1981 to only 28.3 percent in the 2007 
elections.3 Other examples of successful autonomy regimes frequently mentioned by 
pro-autonomy academics and policy-makers include Nagaland in India, the Miskito
1 The author would like to thank Edward Aspinall, Harold Crouch, Sidney Jones, Rodd McGibbon, and an 
anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 See for instance George Tsebelis, "Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational 
Societies," Journal o f Theoretical Politics 2,1 (1990): 5-29; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduction: 
The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in The Politics o f Ethnic Conflict Regulation, ed. John 
McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (London: Routledge, 1993); Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to 
Ethnic Conflicts (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); and Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples 
Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).
3 The decline of the Parti Quebecois was accompanied by the meteoric rise of the populist right-wing 
Action Democratique du Quebec (ADQ), which supported a maximum degree of autonomy for Quebec 
within the Canadian state.
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territories in Nicaragua, Galicia in Spain, South Tyrol in Italy, Gagauzia in Moldova, 
and Crimea in the Ukraine.4
However, an equally influential group of researchers has argued that granting 
regional autonomy and more democracy provides separatist movements with the 
resources they need to further their secessionist cause.5 According to these scholars, the 
implementation of policies offering greater regional autonomy allows separatist 
groups to gain experience in government, sharpen local identities, and prepare the 
infrastructure for the sought-after independent state. These authors can highlight 
examples like Scotland, where the separatist Scottish Nationalist Party used the 
Scotland Act of 1998, which gave the region increased autonomy, to grow into the 
largest party in the territory by 2007. Others again have introduced an analytical 
distinction between regional autonomy and democracy, maintaining that these two 
factors can influence the intensity of separatism in very different ways. Kathleen 
Gallagher Cunningham, for example, has concluded that while the implementation of 
autonomy provisions often reduces demands for secession, this is more likely to occur 
in states with low levels of democracy than in those that offer generous democratic 
rights and freedoms.6 Accordingly, Cunningham submits that "in order to curtail 
violence associated with autonomy or independence movements, governments must 
provide order and limit the opportunity and incentives for extra-systemic violence 
generally."7
In Indonesia, the debate about the interrelation between autonomy and 
secessionism has been the subject of a major policy discourse. At the core of this 
dispute are disagreements over the most effective approach to the provinces of Papua 
and Aceh, where separatist rebellions launched under the New Order continued well 
into the post-authoritarian transition after 1998. Nationalist politicians typically argued 
that generous autonomy offers would lead to Indonesia's disintegration, insisting that 
only military force could quell the rebellions. More liberal figures, on the other hand, 
believed that the state needed to make substantial concessions to the two provinces if it 
wanted to reduce their levels of anti-centralist hostility.8 As a compromise between
4 These examples are highlighted in Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and 
Separatism in the South Caucasus—Cases in Georgia" (PhD dissertation, Uppsala University, 2002); Frans 
Schrijver, "Regionalism after Regionalisation: Regional Identities, Political Space, and Political 
Mobilisation," paper presented at the AAG Pre-Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder, CO, 
April 3-5, 2005; and Thomas Benedikter, "The Working Autonomies in Europe: Territorial Autonomy as a 
Means of Minority Protection and Conflict Solution in the European Experience—An Overview and 
Schematic Comparison," (Bolzano/Bozen: Gesellschaft fur Bedrohte Volker, 2006).
5 Authors who have presented this view include Milica Bookman, The Economics o f Secession (New York, 
NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992); David J. Meyer, "A Place of Our Own: Does the Ethnicization of Territorial 
Control Create Incentives for Elites to Conduct Ethno-Political Mobilization? Cases from the Caucasus in 
Comparative Perspective," paper presented at the Fifth Annual Convention of the ASN, New York, NY, 
April 2000; Dimitry Gorenburg, "Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's 
Ethnic Republics," Europe-Asia Studies, 53,1 (2001): 73-104; and Dawn Brancati, "Decentralization: Fueling 
the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism," International Organization 60, 3 
(2006): 651-685.
6 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Evaluating the Success of Regional Autonomy Regimes," paper 
prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 
31-September 3, 2006.
7 Ibid., p. 18.
8 Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?, Policy Studies 
10 (Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, 2004).
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these two diametrically opposed policy approaches, both Papua and Aceh were given 
special autonomy status in 2001, but this neither included meaningful provisions for 
more democratic participation of their citizens nor a cessation of the military campaign 
against the rebels. International observers consequently maintained that despite 
Indonesia's generally successful process of democratization, Papua and Aceh were still 
subjected to continued military operations, restrictions on political activity, strong 
social control mechanisms, and widespread intimidation of voters during general 
elections. In his assessment for the Freedom House, for example, Edward Aspinall 
asserted that while "the political system [in Indonesia] is open and democratic in its 
basic structures, and multiple actors compete to assert influence," in Papua and Aceh 
"governance problems of all kinds have been amplified, and security forces have 
committed egregious human rights abuses."9
The half-hearted implementation of special autonomy amidst continued repression 
between 2001 and 2005 not only failed to reduce separatist sentiments in both 
provinces, but arguably made them worse. Many Papuans and Acehnese viewed the 
failure of special autonomy to deliver any tangible benefits as final proof that the 
central government had never seriously intended to improve their living conditions. 
Given the lingering discontent in both territories, however, the Jakarta government 
began to introduce important changes from 2004 onwards. To begin with, in the last 
days of Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency, parliament passed a new law on local 
government that introduced the direct election of local government heads for the 
whole of Indonesia.10 While the law guarded against potential separatist candidates by 
requiring them to be nominated by existing national parties, the special autonomy 
regulations for Papua and Aceh granted both areas additional rights as far as the 
nomination of candidates was concerned. Overall, the new electoral framework was a 
remarkable departure from the previous practice, which had reduced the risk of anti­
establishment candidacies by holding the elections in local parliaments filled with 
politicians sympathetic towards the center. Before the new regulations could be 
applied, however, the government granted even more wide-ranging concessions to 
Aceh. Under the Helsinki agreement signed with the separatist Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) in August 2005, the Indonesian government 
allowed for independent candidates to contest the local elections, and even conceded 
the establishment of local political parties in Aceh.
This article discusses the impact of the 2006 local elections in Papua and Aceh on 
secessionist sentiments in both provinces. Analyzing the polls within the context of the 
autonomy legislation for both areas and their larger socio-political setting, the 
discussion highlights two highly diverse trends. On the one hand, both provinces have 
witnessed victories of political leaders known for their past or present association with 
pro-independence groups. In both Papua and Aceh, the winners of the elections owed 
their triumphs to the successful use of anti-Jakarta sentiments, populist rhetoric, and
9 Edward Aspinall, "Countries at the Crossroads: Indonesia," Freedom House Country Reports, http: / / 
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=7&ccrpage=31&ccrcountry=117, accessed on August 
16, 2007.
10 In the initial government draft for the direct local elections, the Megawati cabinet proposed to 
strengthen the grip of the Ministry of Home Affairs on governors and district heads, effectively 
"recentralizing" local government. Most of these suggestions were rejected by the Indonesian parliament, 
however, and thus did not make it into the law passed in September 2004.
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ethno-nationalist symbols. In the same vein, their rise to power has given former 
independence fighters, some of whom had been jailed in the past, access to the 
infrastructure and resources of the state, seemingly confirming the skepticism of 
Bookman11 and others toward generous autonomy regulations. On the other hand, 
however, there were also indications that the elections may, over the longer term, 
erode the secessionist tendencies in Papua and Aceh. Post-election opinion surveys in 
Aceh noted a rise in confidence in the central government, very much in line with 
Gurr's model of successful autonomy regimes.12 By the same token, the elections also 
exposed core-periphery tensions between ethno-regional centers and marginalized 
hinterlands in both Papua and Aceh; these cleavages may potentially undermine the 
very distinct politico-historical identities from which separatist movements typically 
draw their strength. With these two divergent trends at work, it is too early to judge if 
the elections and the autonomy frameworks within which they were held will reduce 
or exacerbate separatist attitudes in both provinces. There is no doubt, however, that 
the current experiment stands a better chance of increasing sympathies for the central 
government than the mixture between military oppression and broken promises of 
autonomy that was applied in the 2001-2005 period.
Local Elections in Papua: Special Autonomy, Internal Divisions, and the Unitary 
State
The election for the governor of Papua in March 2006 took place against the 
backdrop of continued tensions between Indonesia's easternmost province and the 
central government in Jakarta. In 2001, the Indonesian parliament had passed the 
special autonomy legislation for Papua, which was designed to overcome widespread 
dissatisfaction with Jakarta's rule since the gradual integration of the province into 
Indonesia had begun in 1962.13 Many Papuans had suffered under the tight grip of the 
New Order's military apparatus, and they had watched with frustration as the area's 
rich natural resources were extracted largely for the benefit of Jakarta's politico- 
economic elite and international investors.14 Since the 1960s, a small-scale guerrilla 
group named OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Organization) had 
launched occasional attacks on military posts and other institutions associated with the 
central government, but its influence was limited to a few locations in the interior of 
Papua (or Irian Jaya, its official name then). After Suharto's fall in 1998, a new 
movement emerged that tried to take advantage of the temporary weakness of the 
central government to push for Papua's independence from Indonesia. This
11 Bookman, The Economics of Secession.
12 Gurr, Peoples versus States.
13 Under an agreement between the Dutch and Indonesia signed at the United Nations Headquarters in 
New York in August 1962, the Netherlands had to transfer authority over Papua (then known as West 
New Guinea) to a UN-led temporary executive authority in October 1962. The UN, for its part, then had to 
transfer the administration to Indonesia in May 1963. The agreement also stipulated that Indonesia was 
obliged to organize an Act of Free Choice in order to determine if Papuans wanted to remain within the 
Indonesian state or become independent. The Act of Free Choice was eventually held in 1969, confirming 
the status of the province as a part of Indonesia. Although widely viewed as manipulated, the outcome of 
the Act of Free Choice was endorsed by the UN in November 1969.
14 Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies, Policy 
Studies 5 (Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, 2004), p. 24.
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movement, which pledged to achieve its goal with nonviolent methods, included not 
only human rights activists and adat15 leaders, but also many established politicians in 
Papua's local government. In order to contain the initiative, Indonesia's government 
and parliament offered to grant Papua the status of a special autonomy province, 
which was eventually enacted through law in November 2001.
Besides regulating the institutional and financial relationship between Papua and 
the capital, the special autonomy law also included provisions concerning the election 
of Papua's governor. These provisions differed in three important ways from the 
national legislation that determined the process for local elections in the rest of 
Indonesia. First, candidates for the governorship had to be native Papuans. The 
"nativeness" of Papuans, in turn, was defined to include all persons "of Melanesian 
race, comprising native tribes in the province of Papua" and those "accepted and 
acknowledged by the adat community as being native Papuan."16 This formulation 
constituted a compromise between two factions in the Papuan team that had drafted 
the law, with one group proposing to reserve the governorship for indigenous 
Papuans only, while the other argued that long-term immigrants, who made up 
around 40 percent of the province's inhabitants, should not be excluded. In order to 
provide for a fair selection process, the right to establish whether a particular candidate 
was eligible for the governorship was handed to the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua, 
Papuan People's Council), the newly created semi-governmental body consisting 
exclusively of native Papuans.17 The second special condition was that gubernatorial 
nominees in Papua needed to have at least a bachelor's degree, while equivalent 
candidates in the rest of the nation only had to present a high school certificate. Finally, 
the law also stipulated that persons who had been imprisoned for political reasons 
should be allowed to stand as candidates in the elections. This clause, which differed 
from the national regulations, was designed to accommodate former supporters of 
independence who had served sentences for "treason" and "subversion" charges.
While the law introduced important changes, it initially maintained the indirect 
electoral mechanism applied in the rest of the archipelago. Based on Law 23 of 1999, 
governors, mayors, and district heads (bupatis) were to be elected by their respective 
regional legislatures. The Papuan parliament had used this framework when it elected 
seasoned Golkar politician Jaap Solossa as governor in 2000, one year before the special 
autonomy law was enacted. Solossa, a strong supporter of special autonomy who 
warned that independence was an unrealistic goal, had defeated Abraham ("Bram") 
Atururi, a retired marine brigadier-general and former vice-governor of the province.18 
In 2004, however, the national parliament passed a new law regarding local 
government, which introduced direct local elections for all Indonesian provinces, cities, 
and districts. The government addressed the Papuan case in particular sections of this 
law and in subsequent implementing regulations, combining the new electoral
15 Adat is the Indonesian term for custom or tradition.
16 "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Propinsi 
Papua," Jakarta, 21 November 2001, Paragraph 1 (t).
17 The "nativeness" of the candidates for the MRP had been established by electoral committees at each 
administrative level. In the absence of a clear definition of "Papuanness," however, local officials made 
decisions by using their instincts and public perceptions rather than objective criteria.
18 International Crisis Group, "Dividing Papua: How Not to Do It," Asia Briefing No. 24, (Jakarta/
Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), p. 4.
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mechanism with the concessions made to Papua under the 2001 special autonomy 
legislation. Thus the next gubernatorial elections in Papua, which had to be held before 
the conclusion of Solossa's term in November 2005, would not only be direct, but the 
candidates would also have to meet the additional criteria outlined under the special 
autonomy provisions. Obviously, the central government and its supporters hoped 
that this new electoral format would help to reduce the frequently expressed 
discontent in Papuan society over the lack of responsiveness and accountability of its 
elected representatives.
The MRP and the West Irian Jay a Dispute
Before the elections in Papua could be held, two major obstacles had to be 
overcome. First, the Megawati cabinet appeared unwilling to move forward with the 
creation of the MRP. Without the MRP, however, the electoral process lacked the one 
institution that could confirm the eligibility of nominees. Megawati had inherited the 
bill for Papuan special autonomy from her predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid, and 
although she had allowed it to pass into law, the president made no secret of her deep 
suspicion of the arrangement. Consequently, she allowed her Minister of Home 
Affairs, the retired lieutenant-general Hari Sabarno, to delay the establishment of the 
MRP throughout her term, citing technicalities and a general fear that the new 
institution might acquire a political role unintended by the authors of the law. 
Megawati's failure to implement the core element of the Papuan special autonomy 
provisions led to widespread frustration with the central government in Papua and 
even turned political moderates into proponents of a more radical stance vis-a-vis the 
Indonesian authorities.19
The process of establishing the MRP only resumed after Megawati's loss to Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono in the presidential election of September 2004. Shortly after 
Susilo's inauguration, he issued a government regulation that established the MRP and 
set broad guidelines for its operations.20 The process of selecting the members for the 
MRP consumed a lot of time, however, and could not be completed before the initially 
scheduled election date of October 2005. This delay further complicated the already 
protracted situation: because Solossa's term expired in November 2005, before an 
election could be held, the government had to appoint an acting governor to fill the 
vacancy and organize the upcoming polls. Instead of naming a neutral career 
bureaucrat, however, the central government asked Solossa, who was running for 
reelection, to stay in his job. This was in clear violation of existing laws, which did not 
allow acting governors to contest the election. For this reason, his opponents boycotted 
the subsequent stages of the electoral process, declaring they would not reengage until 
after Solossa had surrendered the governorship. This stalemate was unexpectedly 
resolved by Solossa's death of an apparent heart attack in December 2005. The Jakarta 
government then installed an official from the Ministry of Home Affairs as acting 
governor, and the Papuan KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, Local Elections 
Commission) scheduled the gubernatorial ballot for February 2006.
19 «pp j entang MRP Harus Segera Diterbitkan," Suara Pembaruan, September 6, 2003.
20 "Presiden Hadiahi PP MRP ke Rakyat Papua," Bali Post, December 26, 2004.
Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh 7
The delay in creating the MRP had outraged many Papuans, who viewed it as an 
indication that the central government was trying to backtrack on concessions made in 
the special autonomy law.21 However, there was an issue that created even more 
controversy: the unilateral establishment of West Irian Jaya province by the Megawati 
government. The dispute over the legality of the new territory, carved out of Papua 
and inaugurated by presidential decree in January 2003, was the second major factor 
delaying the gubernatorial elections. The key objection of the Papuan elite in Jayapura 
towards the creation of West Irian Jaya was that it had been established without the 
consent of the MRP, which was required by the special autonomy law. Papuan leaders 
thus called on President Megawati to postpone the establishment of the new province 
until the MRP was installed and able to take a decision on the matter. Much to the 
disappointment of Jayapura, however, the central government ignored these requests. 
With the help of several government agencies, acting governor Bram Atururi 
succeeded in consolidating his authority in Manokwari, the capital of the disputed 
territory.22 At the time of the national elections, Atururi managed to hold elections for 
the legislature in West Irian Jaya in April 2004, a vote that led to the establishment of a 
provincial legislature. With a fully developed provincial administration, an electoral 
commission, a local parliament, and representation in the national legislature, the 
infrastructure of the new province was now so deeply entrenched that Susilo's 
government, which took office in October 2004, found it difficult to return West Irian 
Jaya to its pre-2003 status. Even the Constitutional Court, asked by the opponents of 
the split to revoke the 2003 presidential instruction, could not arrive at a clear-cut 
decision. In November 2004, it declared the government regulations underpinning the 
creation of West Irian Jaya unconstitutional, but explicitly acknowledged the de facto 
existence of the province.23 It even mandated the government to issue legal guidelines 
that would clarify—i.e., confirm—the status of West Irian Jaya.
The dispute over West Irian Jaya not only fueled discontent with the central 
government among Papuans, but also had serious consequences for the gubernatorial 
elections. Since 2004, West Irian Jaya had had its own KPUD, which was responsible 
for eight districts and one municipality—and around a quarter of Papua's 
approximately two million voters. With the tacit approval of the central government, 
the KPUD of West Irian Jaya began to prepare its own gubernatorial polls, which were 
scheduled for July 2005. Accordingly, the Papuan KPUD in Jayapura could only make 
preparations for an election that would include the nineteen districts and one 
municipality under its authority.24 The government-sponsored plan for separate 
gubernatorial polls in West Irian Jaya and Papua became the most dominant and 
divisive issue in the relationship between Jayapura and Jakarta on the one hand, and 
Jayapura and Manokwari on the other. Jayapura-based politicians insisted that 
separate elections in West Irian Jaya constituted a blatant breach of the special 
autonomy legislation and other government regulations, which did not allow for 
elections to be held in the territory before the MRP had ruled on the division itself. The
21 Interview with Yan Ayomi, chairman of the Golkar Faction in Papua's Provincial Parliament, layapura, 
July 25, 2005.
22 McGibbon, Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua, p. 60.
23 "Meski UU Pemekaran Papua Gugur, Provinsi Irjabar Sah," Kompas, November 12, 2004.
24 Interview with Yohanis Bonay, member of the Papuan KPUD, Jayapura, July 27, 2005.
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central government, however, argued that the Constitutional Court had confirmed the 
existence of West Irian Jaya, and that therefore the elections could proceed. The MRP, 
for its part, finally issued its ruling on the West Irian Jaya case in February 2006, saying 
that a public consultation it had conducted found overwhelming opposition to the 
split. In consequence, it recommended that the gubernatorial elections be held for the 
whole territory of Papua, after which the issue of territorial divisions could be referred 
to the MRP again for further deliberation.25
The MRP recommendations came too late, however, and thus had no realistic 
chance of implementation. To begin with, the central government was determined to 
move ahead with the gubernatorial election in West Irian Jaya. Eventually, the vote 
was held on March 11 and resulted in a compelling win for Atururi. Moreover, by 
early 2006 even the elite in Jayapura had already given up on the idea of a united 
Papuan election. The KPUD of Papua had finalized the preparations for the elections in 
the area under its control, and most politicians wanted them to move forward without 
waiting for the resolution of the West Irian Jaya dispute. Although they did not have a 
clear idea about how to deal with West Irian Jaya after the polls, the majority of 
politicians in Papua proper believed that a governor equipped with a strong popular 
mandate would be better positioned to represent Papuan interests vis-^-vis the central 
government than a caretaker from the Ministry of Home Affairs.26 In addition, many 
candidates for the governorship became impatient with the numerous delays, having 
already spent billions of Rupiah to maintain their network of supporters. Any further 
postponement would have added an intolerable new burden to their already stretched 
budgets. In view of that, the Papuan elections were scheduled for March 10 (after an 
additional delay for logistical reasons), and the various campaign teams began to set 
their electoral machines in motion.
The conflict over West Irian Jaya eroded the positive momentum that the 
gubernatorial elections in Papua were supposed to develop. Designed to give Papuans 
a bigger voice in their own affairs, the electoral contest instead took place amid heated 
debates over the continued interventionism of the central government. Ironically, had 
the Jakarta government allowed the matter of dividing the province to proceed 
according to the regulations enshrined in the special autonomy law, it is likely that the 
MRP would not only have approved one or two new provinces, but probably six or 
seven. The MRP consultations in West Irian Jaya had concluded that while many 
societal leaders objected to the specific boundaries of the province, they were not 
generally opposed to dividing Papua into several territories. On the contrary, some 
local strongmen demanded even smaller provinces for their home areas. In Fak Fak, for 
example, the MRP was told that the population there wanted its own province, which 
should be autonomous from Manokwari, Jayapura, and Sorong.27 This shows that there
25 Interview with Frans Wospakrik, Deputy Chairman of the MRP, Jayapura, March 9, 2006.
26 Interview with John Ibo, Jayapura, January 6, 2006.
27 Majelis Rakyat Papua, Hasil Konsultasi Publik Panitia Khusus Pemekaran Provinsi Papua Tanggal 19 Januari- 
03 Februari 2006. Buku II. Tim Sorong: 1. Kabupaten dan Kota Sorong; 2. Kapubaten Raja Empat; 3. Kabupaten 
Sorong Selatan (Jayapura: Majelis Rakyat Papua, 2006). Providing further evidence for this trend, in early 
2007 a senior Papuan politician set up a committee to push for the establishment of Papua Barat Daya, 
comprising the city and district of Sorong, South Sorong, Raja Empat, and Teluk Bintuni. This new 
province, if approved, would be carved out of West Irian Jaya. See "Propinsi Papua Barat Daya, 
Dideklarasikan," Cenderawasih Pos, January 16, 2007.
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were a number of intra-Papuan divisions that, if allowed to play out democratically, 
had the potential to undermine the very concept of pan-Papuan nationalism that had 
so far stimulated the drive for independence. Instead, the perceived intervention by 
conservative politicians in Jakarta united most Papuans in the all-encompassing 
campaign against West Irian Jaya, and conveniently papered over the conflicts within 
Papuan society itself. The significance of these internal divisions became evident in the 
campaign strategies of the various candidates for the governorship, which were 
defined by the demarcation lines between Papua's dominant ethnic, social, and 
political groups.
Elections and Identity: The Dispute over "Papuanness"
In spite of the almost unanimous opposition against the creation of West Irian Jaya, 
the gubernatorial elections revealed deep internal divisions in Papuan society. One of 
the major cleavages sharpened by the electoral contest was that between native 
Papuans and immigrants from other Indonesian islands. The immigrants, who are 
mostly from Sulawesi and Java and dominate economic life in the province, were not 
eligible to run for the governorship, but they nevertheless had voting rights. They thus 
formed a huge voting block that candidates in the electoral race found difficult to 
ignore. Naturally, immigrants to Papua had political, social, and economic interests 
that were often diametrically opposed to those of their native Papuan counterparts. 
Immigrants were largely concerned with personal safety and the security of their 
investments, and as a vast majority of them were Muslim, they demanded freedom to 
practice their religion in the predominantly Christian province. Native Papuans, on the 
other hand, tended to be openly suspicious that immigration into Papua was facilitated 
as part of a deliberate long-term policy by the central government to shift the 
demographic composition of the territory in favor of non-Papuan Indonesians. 
Therefore, they expected promises from the gubernatorial candidates to halt 
immigration, implement economic policies that exclusively favored Papuans, and 
protect their Christian religion from what they viewed as Indonesia's increasing 
Islamization. These significant gaps in electoral expectations created difficult 
challenges for the candidates, who needed to address the concerns of immigrants 
without alienating their core constituency of native Papuans. How hard it was to keep 
this delicate balance was illustrated by the campaign of Dick Henk Wabiser, a retired 
admiral. Trying to attract votes from the immigrant population, Wabiser initially 
pledged a heavy-handed approach to Papua's internal security problems. However, as 
he came to recognize that native Papuans felt unhappy with this platform, Wabiser 
changed tactics in the middle of the campaign and suddenly proposed drastic 
measures to curb immigration. Consequently, both immigrants and native Papuans 
turned their backs on him, leading to the collapse of Wabiser's campaign.
The elections not only highlighted the deep divide between native Papuans and 
immigrants, however. They also raised questions concerning the very concept of 
"Papuanness" that had so far served as the bond between Papua's many diverse 
groups and constituencies. This confusion over what exactly constituted Papuanness 
became evident in the discussions within the MRP over the eligibility of the various 
nominees. As a result of these debates, Muhammad Musa'ad and Komaruddin 
Watubun, who were both running for the vice-governorship, were disqualified from
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the race, revealing multiple layers in Papuan ethnicity that defied precise definitions. 
Musa'ad had been born to a Papuan mother and a father of Arabic descent, whose 
family had arrived in the area of Fak Fak in the 1800s. Musa'ad's Muslim family had 
played a key role in developing the town, and formed part of an aristocratic elite that 
had wide networks among local tribes and clans. For that reason, Musa'ad believed 
that both conditions spelled out under the special autonomy law applied to him—he 
was both a native Papuan by birth and was accepted by adat leaders as a member of the 
Papuan community.28
Confident that he would pass the verification process, Musa'ad left for Jakarta 
when the MRP held its meeting on the issue in November 2005. He felt further 
reassured when the chairman of the MRP, Agus Alue Alua, phoned him to report 
about the proceedings. According to Alue, the special committee of the MRP in charge 
of verification, which comprised adat leaders, had recommended that all candidates be 
declared eligible to contest the election.29 The plenary session of the MRP, however, 
delayed its endorsement of the recommendation to the following day. When the 
session opened again, some MRP members demanded a vote on the recommendation, 
saying that Papuans were only those with "black skin and frizzy hair."30 Their 
protestations pointed to the failure of the MRP to establish clear criteria to determine 
the eligibility of candidates. Consequently, the discussions between the MRP members 
became increasingly emotional and ended only when the matter was put to a vote. Out 
of 42 members, 8 voted for the acceptance of Musa'ad as a native Papuan, 27 voted 
against, one abstained, and the rest walked out.
The MRP decision triggered violent protests by Musa'ad's supporters. Musa'ad 
had been nominated as running mate to Lukas Enembe, a fiery politician from the 
central highlands. Suspecting that then governor Solossa had influenced the MRP 
decision in order to prevent Musa'ad from attracting the majority of Muslim votes, 
Enembe's fanatic supporters attacked the KPUD office in Jayapura and demanded that 
the verdict of the MRP be overturned.31 They only ceased their protests after it was 
announced that Musa'ad had appointed another Muslim candidate to replace him as 
Enembe's vice-gubernatorial nominee.
In the other case before the MRP, that of Komaruddin Watubun, the political 
implications were much less sensitive, as his nomination was controversial even within 
his own party.32 Nevertheless, the basis for his exclusion from the elections was shaky. 
Komaruddin, who originated from the Kei Islands and had been living in Papua since 
his childhood, pointed out that the special autonomy law defined native Papuans as
28 Interview with Muhammad Musa'ad, Jayapura, March 7, 2006.
29 Kelompok Kerja Adat (Pokja) MRP, Pertimbangan Persetujuan Tentang 5 (Lima) Pasangan Calon 
Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur, Jayapura, November 16, 2005.
30 International Crisis Group, "Papua: The Danger of Shutting Down Dialogue," Asia Briefing Paper No.
47 (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006), p. 9.
31 Ibid., p. 9.
32 Komaruddin was the chairman of the provincial chapter of PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia- 
Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) in Papua, which had nominated him to run for vice- 
governor on Barnabas Suebu's ticket. However, PDI-P's general chairwoman, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
refused to endorse Komaruddin because he belonged to a group of Megawati critics within PDI-P. Thus 
even if the MRP had not disqualified Komaruddin, Megawati would most likely have sacked him before 
his nomination became official.
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originating from the Melanesian race, and that the Keiese fell under that definition.33 
The Kei Islands belong to the province of Maluku, but geographically they are as close 
to the Papuan mainland as Biak, for example. Since the colonial period, the Keiese have 
occupied a large number of bureaucratic and educational positions in Papua, and 
many of them have resided there for several generations. Intermarriage, mostly with 
Papuans from the coast, has further strengthened their ties to the province. In 
Komaruddin's case, he had also received written declarations from adat leaders that he 
was acknowledged as part of the Papuan community, thus clearly fulfilling one of the 
alternative criteria set out under the special autonomy provisions. Accordingly, despite 
the absence of protests, Komaruddin's exclusion from the election further contributed 
to the controversy about the way "Papuanness" was defined, and how existing 
regulations were applied.
The tensions triggered by the disqualifications indicated that the more competitive 
electoral format presented the Papuan elite not only with great opportunities, but also 
with considerable risks. On the one hand, the direct elections offered Papuans the 
chance to play a greater role in the management of their own affairs, claim more 
resources for their local needs, and build the institutional, economic, and educational 
infrastructure of the province according to their own developmental agenda. 
According to authors like Meyer34 and Gorenburg35, the assumption of greater powers 
by local elites in special autonomy areas can, in fact, make these elites so powerful that 
they eventually increase—rather than reduce—their demands for independence. 
However, the Papuan case also demonstrates that more electoral competition in special 
autonomy territories has the potential to expose internal divisions that can complicate 
the scenario outlined by Meyer and Gorenburg. In Papua, the election highlighted 
long-established primordial and socio-political cleavages, with the debate over the role 
of immigrants and the definition of Papuanness being only the first in a long list of 
intra-Papuan disputes that erupted in the course of the ballot. These dynamics helped 
to confute the frequently held view that Papuan politics are largely dictated by the 
conflict between a united Papuan society on the one hand and the interventionist 
Jakarta government on the other. Apparently, the ambition of Papuan elites to increase 
their autonomy from the Indonesian capital was not only obstructed by ultranationalist 
politicians in Jakarta, but also by severe friction within Papuan society itself.
Ethnic and Regional Divisions: Coast versus the Interior
Papua's socio-ethnic fragmentation into tribes and clans has been well documented 
in anthropological terms,36 but it was one cleavage in particular that gained great
33 Interview with Komaruddin Watubun, Deputy Chairman of Papua's Provincial Parliament, Jayapura, 
March 8, 2006.
34 Meyer, "A Place of Our Own."
35 Gorenburg, "Nationalism for the Masses."
36 Rodd McGibbon explained that "312 tribes exist in Papua from a total indigenous population of less 
than 1.5 million people. The largest tribes in Papua are the Dani and Dani/Ndani, inhabiting the densely 
populated regions of the interior and its fertile valleys, and the Biaks, who inhabit the coastal region of 
Biak-Numfor. These three broad tribal groupings each comprise approximately 150,000 people—double 
the population of the next largest tribes. The seven largest tribes have a combined population that 
amounts to 80 percent of the total indigenous population. The remaining 20 percent are divided into some 
300 tribal groups of which two-thirds have a population of less than 1,000 people. To make matters even
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political significance during the gubernatorial election: the ethno-regional division 
between coastal Papuans and their counterparts from the interior. This division had 
historical roots, but the ballot further sharpened its demarcation lines. Since the 
colonial period, Papuans from coastal areas had enjoyed significantly better 
educational opportunities, which enabled them to occupy key positions in the 
bureaucracy and the private sector. As a result, Papuans from Biak, Serui, Sentani, 
Sorong, and Fak Fak have dominated political and social life in the province, with local 
government, churches, and non-governmental organizations typically run by figures 
from these coastal regions. People from the interior, on the other hand, have 
traditionally felt underprivileged. According to Rodd McGibbon, "the socio-economic 
changes from the 1970s reinforced this basic cleavage and intensified the sense of 
disadvantage in the densely populated areas of the interior."37 Many members of tribes 
from the interior, most notably from the Lani and the Dani, have increasingly left their 
valleys in search of employment opportunities in the urban centers. In the cities, 
however, people from the interior find it hard to compete with immigrants from 
Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Java, leading to social and economic imbalances that tend to 
further consolidate the marginalization of central highlanders.
At the same time, many coastal Papuans have moved into the interior, filling the 
additional bureaucratic jobs that have become available since the drastic increase of 
districts in Papua and West Irian Jaya from 9 to 29 between 1998 and 2004. This two- 
way flow of intra-Papuan migration has intensified the tensions between the two 
broad groups, and has also given rise to distinctly socio-ethnic tones in the political 
competition. In recent years, Papuans from the interior have often complained about 
the fact that no one representing their group has ever obtained the governorship. Jaap 
Solossa had been the last in a series of coastal Papuans in that position, and like most 
of his predecessors, he had handed numerous top jobs in the bureaucracy to members 
of his clan or other influential figures from his home region.38
The challenge launched by the central highlands to the political superiority of the 
coastal areas was epitomized in the candidacy of Lukas Enembe, the deputy bupati of 
Puncak Jaya district in the interior of Papua. Enembe's campaign, which was 
supported by the Christian party PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera, Party of Peace and 
Prosperity), drew its strength from a simple appeal to the tribes of the interior to break 
the monopolistic grip of coastal Papua on the governorship. While preparing his 
gubernatorial candidacy, Enembe made the acquaintance of Musa'ad, who had co­
authored Papua's special autonomy law and was courted by several Islamic parties to 
represent them in the elections. Musa'ad eventually became Enembe's running mate, 
adding a strong Muslim element to Enembe's predominantly ethnic platform. This 
religio-ethnic blend was maintained even after Musa'ad's disqualification by the MRP. 
Despite protests of Enembe's supporters against the decision, Musa'ad finally
more complex, each tribe is organized into subtribes, clans, and subclans." See Rodd McGibbon, Plural 
Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict, Policy Studies 13 (Washington, DC: East 
West Center Washington, 2004), p. 31.
37 Ibid., p. 34.
38 The tendency of incumbent governors to distribute key posts among their own constituency was 
reflected in the popular acronym SOS, which stood for "Semua Orang Sorong" (Everybody Is from 
Sorong) or "Semua Orang Serui" (Everybody Is from Serui), depending on the sitting governor's 
hometown. Solossa was from Sorong.
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surrendered to the MRP's judgment and invited a Muslim banker, Arobi Ahmad 
Aituarauw, to replace him.39 Declaring that it was a religious obligation for Muslims to 
vote for him, Arobi—as the only Islamic candidate in the race—was able to bind a large 
number of immigrants to Enembe's campaign.
Table 1: Results of the 2006 Gubernatorial Election in Papua
No. N a m e s  o f  C a n d id a t e s V o t e s P e r c e n t a g e P a r t y  A f f il ia t io n
1 Barnabas Suebu —  
Alex Hesegem
354.763 31.5 % PDI-P-led coalition
2 Lukas Enembe —  
H. Arobi Ahmad 
Aituarauw
333.623 29.6 % PDS-led coalition 
(including Islamic parties)
3 John Ibo — O askalis Kossy 258.475 22.9 % Golkar
4 Constant Karma —  
Donatus Motte
112.033 9.9% Coalition of small parties
5 D irk Henk W abiser —  
S imon Petrus Inaury
67.671 6.0% Partai D emokrat-led 
coalition
Enembe's impressive performance in the elections (he unexpectedly finished 
second, with 29.6 percent of the votes) highlighted the continued volatility of intra- 
Papuan tensions. Enembe's campaign message—that it was now time for a candidate 
from the interior to assume the governorship—resonated well with ethnic highlanders, 
and provided him with a fanatical and numerically significant support base.40 During 
the campaign, Enembe announced that his leadership style as governor would be 
"traditional," further strengthening his appeal to politically archaic tribal communities 
that sought to facilitate the rise of one of their leaders to the governorship. Enembe's 
campaign so openly relied on primordial sentiments that he was able easily to brush 
aside criticisms of his lack of a detailed political program. Accordingly, the remark by 
one of his critics that "Papua seeks to elect a governor, not a tribal or adat leader"41 had
39 Musa'ad had spent a week visiting mosques and other Islamic meeting places to recruit a replacement. 
Arobi only agreed to run after no other Muslim nominee of Papuan origin (a rather rare combination) was 
found. Interview with Muhammad Musa'ad, Jayapura, March 7, 2006.
40 Fifty-five percent of all voters were concentrated in the major central highland districts—Pegunungan 
Bintang, Yahukimo, Tolikara, Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, and Mimika—with additional central 
highlanders living in other districts.
41 Remark by a political commentator on TVRI's local television channel in Jayapura, March 8, 2006.
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no measurable effect on his ratings in the preelection opinion polls. In fact, despite the 
candidate's poor performances in the televised debates with his rivals in the election, 
Enembe's following grew steadily, and by the end of the campaign, he had overtaken 
several candidates with well-entrenched power networks and more sophisticated 
political platforms. Ultimately, he got within a hairsbreadth of winning the elections. 
The final figures put Enembe only around 20,000 votes behind the leader, with a total 
of more than 1.1 million votes cast.42 Claiming that there had been irregularities during 
the vote count in the district of Yahukimo, Enembe lodged a complaint with the 
Supreme Court and asked it to overturn the result. However, as they had done in most 
other cases that involved complaints over local election results, the judges decided to 
reject the lawsuit and confirm the official KPUD figures.
Enembe's narrow defeat was largely caused by his inability to claim the exclusive 
support of ethnic highlanders. Although at Enembe's final campaign event a 
prominent tribal leader claimed that the interior's approximately 750,000 votes had 
already been secured for his campaign, the reality on the ground was different. Each of 
Enembe's four competitors, who all originated from coastal regions, had posted 
candidates from the interior as their running mates. With each of these four vice- 
gubernatorial nominees laying claim to support from their respective tribes, Enembe's 
chances of uniting the central highland behind his campaign had been seriously 
diminished.43 This trend was aggravated by Enembe's relatively low name recognition, 
both at the provincial level and in the highlands themselves. Prior to the campaign, 
only 40 percent of voters had heard of Enembe, the lowest figure for all gubernatorial 
nominees.44 Although his popularity skyrocketed during the campaign, the preelection 
surveys demonstrated that many voters in the interior did not view Enembe as an 
authoritative figure with the potential to command the undisputed loyalty of the 
highland communities. Consequently, significant sections of the highland electorate 
supported those vice-gubernatorial candidates who originated from their respective 
tribes or regions, instead of throwing their support behind Enembe.
The ethnic differences dividing Enembe from his rivals were not the only 
indication of Papua's regional fragmentation. Beyond Irian Jaya Barat, several regions 
in Papua had long sought the establishment of their own provinces,45 and they viewed 
the election campaign as a perfect opportunity to promote their own interests. Most 
importantly, politicians in Merauke believed that it was now the right time to launch 
their initiative for the creation of South Papua. Residents in the area around Merauke, 
many of them Catholics, have for decades felt marginalized by the largely Protestant 
capital of Jayapura, and their demands for an administrative split from Papua proper 
had increased since the dispute over West Irian Jaya. John Gluba Gebze, the bupati of
42 "Tinggal Beda Seribuan," Cendmwasih Pos, March 20, 2006.
43 Members of Enembe's campaign team could not even reach agreement among themselves when asked 
about the ethnic affiliations of their nominee. Some claimed he was a Dani, but others suggested that the 
tribe of the Enembe, to which the candidate belonged, was too independent to be categorized as Dani. The 
heated debate that this question triggered among the candidate's own supporters indicated how difficult it 
was to establish a claim to represent all highland tribes. Interview with Enembe supporters, Jayapura, 
March 5,2006.
44 "Hasil Survey Pilkada Propinsi Papua 2006," Lingkaran Survei Indonesia.
45 Richard Chauvel, Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation, Policy Series 14 
(Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, 2004), p. 77.
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Merauke and chairman of the local Golkar branch, led the campaign to create South 
Papua.46 In his ambition to accelerate the establishment of the province, he even 
engaged in political extortion of his own provincial party chairman and Golkar's 
nominee for the governorship, John Ibo. When Ibo came to Merauke to campaign for 
his gubernatorial candidacy, Gebze publicly declared that the Golkar party in Merauke 
would only support him if he signed an agreement to facilitate the inauguration of 
South Papua by 2007, at the latest.47 Trailing in the opinion polls, Ibo reluctantly 
agreed.
In response, John Ibo's main competitor, Barnabas Suebu, promised to grant the 
southern regions their own administrative unit, but refrained from committing to a 
new province. Instead, he offered to support the partition of Papua into Western 
Papua, Southern Papua, Northern Papua, and Central Highland Papua, with each 
region headed by a resident (following the administrative terminology of the Dutch 
colonial government).48 If these areas insisted on having their own governors, however, 
then Papua could serve as a supra-provincial entity led by a governor-general. 
Enembe, for his part, simply reminded the electorate in Merauke that no Meraukan 
had ever held the governorship and promised that, if they supported him this time, he 
would make sure that the next governor, after himself, came from Merauke.
Ethnic and local identities were clearly significant in determining electoral 
behavior, but other factors played a role as well. Barnabas Suebu, the eventual winner 
of the elections, attracted many voters with his modern approach to electoral 
campaigning, which put more stress on image-building in the media and the 
development of policy platforms than on primordial affiliations. Using his solid cross­
tribal popularity, Suebu established a strong lead in the opinion polls and ultimately 
won the governorship with 31.5 percent of the votes. Besides his promise to allocate 
more funds for community development programs in the villages, there was one issue 
in particular that propelled Suebu to victory: his criticism of the central government, 
accompanied by rumors that he was sympathetic towards the idea of Papuan 
independence—which the candidate only half-heartedly denied.
The "M" Factor: Between Special Autonomy and "Merdeka"
The issue of Papuan independence was the elephant in the room during the entire 
campaign. Candidates neither expressed support for it nor discussed it in any detail, 
yet there were widespread discussions among voters about the preferences of the 
various candidates. Given the nature of this "hidden" campaign, it is difficult 
quantitatively to assess its impact on the electoral behavior of Papuans. The losing 
candidates, however, were certain that Suebu's victory was due to his image as a tacit 
supporter of independence. John Ibo, for example, accused Suebu of having promised 
voters that Papua would gain independence one year after his election.49 Although 
there was no evidence for this allegation, it was quickly picked up by another 
unsuccessful nominee, Dick Henk Wabiser. Wabiser demanded that the governor-elect
46 "Suara Pecah dari Selatan," Suara Perempuan Papua, March 6, 2006.
47 "John Ibo Ditawarin Pembentukan Provinsi Papua Selatan," Cendrawasih Pos, February 9, 2006.
48 Interview with Barnabas Suebu, Jayapura, March 8, 2006.
49 "Heran Dengan Hasil Coblosan," Cendrawasih Pos, March 15, 2006.
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undergo a "special examination" (litsus) to establish his loyalty to the Indonesian 
unitary state, insinuating that Suebu had campaigned on a platform that advocated 
independence.50
The depiction of Suebu as a supporter of independence was somewhat ironic, 
given that he had been a key figure in Papua's political establishment since the New 
Order. A senior member of the Golkar party, Suebu had been governor of Irian Jaya 
between 1988 and 1993. His political career had foundered, however, following several 
run-ins with then President Suharto. After a term as ambassador to Mexico, Honduras, 
and Panama, Suebu returned to Indonesia in 2002 and became an outspoken analyst 
and observer of Papuan affairs. In 2003, he had called Megawati's decision to split 
Papua "unconstitutional," leading him to believe that he had damaged his relationship 
to the PDI-P chairwoman irreparably.51 In the same vein, he had criticized then- 
governor Solossa, a fellow Golkar cadre, for not doing enough to implement the special 
autonomy law to the letter. Despite his non-involvement in formal politics, Suebu 
maintained close relationships with both Papuan activists in Jakarta and key social 
groups in the province, and the idea that he should try a second run for the 
governorship was first proposed in these circles.
To Suebu's surprise, it was Megawati who offered him the gubernatorial 
nomination of her party. Megawati was not known for easily forgiving her critics, and 
Suebu's closeness to Papuan groups that demanded independence seemed to provide 
an additional disincentive for the nationalist-unitarian PDI-P to nominate him. But in 
early 2005, Megawati invited him to Bali to discuss his candidacy, and he found her 
sympathetic. In the meeting, she queried him about his links to pro-independence 
circles and tried to verify rumors that one of Suebu's children was going to get married 
to UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan's son (which she would have viewed as an attempt 
to internationalize the Papua problem).52 Suebu laughed off this gossip as the result of 
"unprofessional intelligence reporting," and subsequently explained his stance on 
Papuan independence and special autonomy. He asserted that Papua was deeply split 
between supporters of independence and those who advocated continued association 
with the Indonesian state, and that his main task would be to bridge these 
diametrically opposed aspirations. According to Suebu, the most suitable compromise 
in this regard was special autonomy, which he pledged to implement consistently. He 
told Megawati that Jakarta's failure to uphold the special autonomy legislation had 
given the biggest boost to the pro-independence movement, and that only a visible 
improvement in the living conditions of ordinary Papuans could increase their 
acceptance of the Indonesian state. After a long discussion, Megawati expressed 
satisfaction with Suebu's clarifications and announced that PDI-P would nominate him 
for the governorship. It was this concept of special autonomy as the bridge between the 
pro-independence movement and supporters of the Indonesian state that Suebu 
subsequently presented at most of his campaign appearances ahead of the election.
50 "Siap Terima Kekalahan," Cmdmwasih Pos, March 14, 2006. Litsus was a notorious instrument of social 
control during the New Order, comprising security checks run by the armed forces on every candidate for 
political office, or even on ordinary citizens applying for jobs. If any connection to the communist "coup" 
in 1965 or to other dissident groups was found, the candidate was declared ineligible for the post he or she 
had applied for.
51 Interview with Barnabas Suebu, Jayapura, March 8, 2006.
52 Ibid.
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If Suebu appeared to have profited from his careful handling of the independence 
issue, some of his rivals were less successful. John Ibo, for example, felt that his 
criticism of Indonesian rule was so well known to the Papuan electorate that it was 
unnecessary to stress this point further. On the contrary, he deemed it important to 
convince conservative elements in the Jakarta elite that he would be able to cooperate 
with the central government if elected as governor.53 The background to this decision 
was an incident at the funeral of Jaap Solassa, whom Ibo had replaced as Golkar's 
candidate for the governorship. At Solossa's grave, the military and police 
commanders of Papua approached Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, who, as chairman of the 
Golkar party, had decided that Ibo would run. In front of Kalla, both security officers 
questioned Ibo's loyalty towards the Indonesian state, triggering nervous discussions 
in the Golkar camp about how to deal with this problem.54 Eventually it was agreed 
that Ibo would run full-page advertisements in several Papuan dailies, swearing 
allegiance to the Indonesian state and stating that Papua's integration into the republic 
was final. The ads ran in early January 2006, and many of Ibo's supporters believed, in 
retrospect, that they helped to seal his defeat. The polling figures for Ibo began to 
decline, and many Golkar officials at the grassroots level gradually switched their 
support to Suebu, who had continued to cultivate the party despite his nomination by 
PDI-P. When even Kalla indicated that he was convinced of Suebu's victory, a large 
number of Golkar functionaries saw no reason to continue backing the party's official 
nominee and started to campaign for Suebu instead. One of Ibo's deputies bitterly 
recalled that "when our own party leaders began to approach Suebu with offers of 
cooperation, that basically killed our campaign."55
Another candidate who got entangled in the politics of independence was Dick 
Henk Wabiser. The experienced navy pilot had been the commander of Papua's naval 
base between 2002 and 2004, following in the footsteps of former governor Freddy 
Numberi, who had moved on to join the Wahid and Susilo cabinets. Apparently, 
Wabiser had hoped that many voters would reward him for his struggle to uphold the 
unitary state of Indonesia in Papua, but he had misjudged the political mood. Many 
Papuans were highly critical of the security apparatus, particularly for their heavy- 
handed approach to critics of Indonesian rule. Wabiser consequently finished last in 
the elections, a failure due not only to strategic mistakes made in planning his 
campaign, but also to the negative image of the armed forces in territories with high 
levels of military operations.
Election Aftermath: Suebu's Village Development Program
The gubernatorial election in Papua was an essential element of the central 
government's plan to offer more autonomy and democratic rights to the residents of 
the conflict-torn province. The ballot provided citizens with a rare opportunity to 
discuss issues, express dissatisfaction with the status quo, and vote for the politician 
who they thought represented their interests best. For political analysts, the electoral
53 Interview with John Ibo, Jayapura, January 6, 2006.




contest provided invaluable insights into the dynamics of intra-Papuan tensions, 
anticipating some of the possible trends that could dominate Papuan politics under 
fully implemented special autonomy. But while the election was important as an act of 
democratic participation and a catalyst of political interaction, the quality of the elected 
governor and his administration were (and will continue to be) equally crucial in 
determining the impact of the ballot on the level of secessionist sentiments in Papua. 
Much of the literature on regional autonomy regimes focuses on the way elected 
leaders capitalize on the expanded authority granted by the central government. In this 
regard, pessimistic authors such as Bookman56 or Brancati57 warn that executives 
elected in special autonomy regions can use their new powers and resources to 
consolidate regional identities and create bureaucratic infrastructures as embryos for 
future independent states. On the other hand, scholars like Lapidoth58 believe that if 
governments in special autonomy regions use their resources effectively to support 
economic growth and political stability, this will reduce rather than intensify demands 
for separation from the state to which the autonomous region belongs.
In the Papuan case, it is too early to make conclusive judgments about the possible 
impact of the Suebu governorship on the extent of separatist attitudes in the Papuan 
elite and society. To be sure, Barnabas Suebu has made good on many of his campaign 
promises, replacing key bureaucrats and revamping the mechanism through which the 
special autonomy money is allocated and spent. Previously, the funds were channeled 
through the administrations of districts and subdistricts, which used most of the 
allocations for "operational expenses" and only very little for development projects in 
the villages. In his first provincial budget as governor in 2007, Suebu shifted the 
balance between spending on social empowerment, infrastructure projects, and the 
state apparatus heavily towards the first two components, which now make up 45 and 
28 percent of the total budget, respectively.59 In addition, as announced during the 
campaign, he allocated around 300 billion Rupiah (US$33.3 million) for block grants to 
all 2,600 villages in Papua, providing them with around 100 million Rupiah each for 
development programs. In June 2007, Suebu personally toured hundreds of villages in 
Papua to introduce the scheme, promising that communities that used the money 
wisely would get more in the next fiscal year, while those wasting the funds on 
consumption would see their allocations terminated.60 Although it is still unclear if 
Suebu's idea will work as planned, it already has made some conservative elements in 
the Jakarta elite nervous. Like the skeptics in the scholarly debate on regional 
autonomy regimes, the former head of BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, State Intelligence 
Agency), Hendropriyono, publicly expressed his suspicion that the new development 
funds would strengthen the separatist movement rather than weaken it.61 However, 
any assessment of the relevance of such suspicions will have to be suspended until the 
social, economic, and political impact of Suebu's program can be objectively evaluated.
56 Bookman, The Economics of Secession.
57 Brancati, "Decentralization."
58 Lapidoth, Autonomy.
59 "Papua Governor Heads Out on Ambitious 2,600-Kampong Tour," Jakarta Post, June 5, 2007.
60 "Suebu Minta Pemborong Tak Kerjakan Proyek di Kampung," Cendrawasih Pos, June 9, 2007.
61 "Gubernur Klarifikasi ke BIN," Cendrawasih Pos, July 11, 2007.
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While predictions about the effect of increased democratization and expanded 
autonomy rights on Papuan society are currently premature, it appears that many local 
elite figures are so deeply entrenched in the paradigm of secessionism that 
developmental or political concessions may be unable to change their minds. The July 
2007 congress of the DAP (Dewan Adat Papua, Papuan Customary Council), which is 
probably the most influential organization of informal leaders in the province, 
underscored that phenomenon. Unimpressed by the new electoral rights and the 
government's promises to increase the total budget allocations for Papua to around 18 
trillion Rupiah (around US$2 billion) each year, most speakers at the congress 
demanded a referendum on the independence of Papua from Indonesia. One DAP 
leader called the special autonomy funds "the sweets used to lure Papuans into their 
own eradication."62 Another speaker warned that "if Papua remains within the 
Indonesian unitary state, it will result in the extinction of the Papuan people by 
Indonesia."63 The congress made national and even international headlines because a 
group of dancers had carried the flag of Papuan nationalism during the opening 
ceremony, leading to the investigation of several DAP leaders by Papuan police and 
calls by ultraconservative politicians in Jakarta to crack down on the independence 
movement. With many Papuan elites unwilling to change their pro-independence 
stance for ideological and historical reasons, it remains to be seen what impact the new 
policy approaches will have on ordinary Papuans at the grassroots level.
Preliminary Conclusion: The Elections in Papua- Whose Victory?
In concluding the discussion on the gubernatorial elections in Papua, it is 
important to note their very mixed implications for the relationship between Papua 
and Indonesian political leaders. Obviously, many in the central government had 
hoped that a strong supporter of Papua's integration into the Indonesian republic 
would emerge as the winner. The victory of a pro-Indonesian figure such as the former 
vice-governor Constant Karma would have allowed the government to "sell" the 
election result domestically and internationally as a resounding endorsement of 
Indonesian rule in Papua. Instead, Suebu's rise to power pointed to the dissatisfaction 
among ordinary Papuans with the political status quo, and it raised concerns within 
conservative circles in Jakarta that the new governor might use the resources and 
authority now at his disposal to catalyze, rather than contain, the anti-Indonesian 
attitudes in Papuan society. In this regard, they particularly feared that Suebu would 
fill key positions in the Papuan administration with his loyalists, making it more 
difficult for the central government to supervise policy implementation on the ground. 
To some extent, this has indeed occurred, with Suebu even managing to have a career 
bureaucrat with longstanding experience in Papuan community development 
appointed to the powerful post of provincial secretary. In much the same manner, 
Suebu has gained control over substantial financial resources, which he immediately 
used to fund his long-planned village empowerment projects. Many central 
governments that grant more powers to their autonomous regions are worried that 
newly elected leaders of such territories could "amass resources to challenge the state
62 "Isu Referendum Mengemuka," Cendrawasih Pos, July 5, 2007.
63 Ibid.
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more forcefully/'64 and Indonesia's national leadership is certainly concerned that 
Suebu may be a case in point.
But the election also displayed trends that, in the longer term, could help to erode 
secessionist sentiments in Papua. To begin with, while Suebu's victory reflected deep 
discontent among Papuans with their status in the Indonesian unitary state, it also 
confirmed the credibility of the electoral process. Despite serious administrative and 
logistical shortcomings, the vote had been largely fair and transparent. There was no 
doubt that Suebu was the genuine winner of the ballot, contradicting skeptics who had 
little faith in the ability or will of the central government to hold professional polls in 
Papua. The fact that a retired military officer did not stand a chance in the elections, for 
example, disproved the myth of the armed forces' omnipotence in the province, and 
could potentially strengthen the confidence of Papuans in electoral procedures. Thus 
while the introduction of democratic competition may have helped critics of 
Indonesia's rule in Papua to gain power, it was an important first step in addressing 
the continued doubts of many Papuans about the representativeness and 
responsiveness of the political system.
Besides increasing the credibility of the democratic process, the election also 
highlighted significant divisions within Papuan society that have the potential to 
weaken demands for the creation of an independent Papuan state. The electoral 
competition sharpened the multiple ethnic, religious, and regional differences among 
Papuans, even triggering heated debates about the concept of "Papuanness" itself. 
These dynamics continued after the election, with Suebu encountering serious 
difficulties in maintaining the unity of Papua as an administrative, political, and 
cultural entity. Most importantly, the new governor finally had to endorse the de facto 
existence of West Irian Jaya. In a contract Suebu signed with Atururi in Biak in April 
2007, the two provinces agreed on resource-sharing arrangements that effectively 
codified the separation between the two areas. West Irian Jaya was subsequently 
renamed as West Papua, and while both sides maintained that the central government 
still needed to integrate the new province into the special autonomy framework, the 
split now seemed irreversible. In addition, regional powerbrokers continued to push 
for the establishment of their own provinces. In February 2007, the initiative to create 
South Papua was officially launched, and other areas were considering similar moves.
Moreover, Suebu had to give up his opposition to the creation of more districts in 
his province. In early 2007, Suebu had asked the central government to stop the 
inauguration of six new districts, triggering noisy protests from the areas concerned.65 
Suebu then had to acknowledge that he did not fully understand the institutional 
process that had led to the establishment of the new districts, and he eventually 
withdrew his request. These events suggested that the decision of the central 
government to grant more authority to Papuans to deal with their own affairs has 
forced Papuans increasingly to address their internal social fissures, drawing some 
attention away from their problematic relationship with Indonesia's central 
government. Hence, from the Indonesian perspective, the risk of handing greater 
powers to groups with potential secessionist aspirations appears to have been balanced
64 Cunningham, "Evaluating the Success of Regional Autonomy Regimes," p. 4.
65 "Tiga Kabupaten Kecewa Dengan Surat Gubernur," Cendrawasih Pos, February 17, 2007.
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by the increased pressure on those groups to deal with complicated issues of 
governance, confront expectations from the grassroots level to perform, and mitigate 
tensions within their own communities. What is more, these trends did not only 
emerge from the local elections in Papua; they would also characterize the polls in 
Aceh, which were held in December 2006, six months after the Papua ballot.
Local Elections in Aceh: GAM between Fragmentation and Victory
The election in Papua was the result of a protracted, but largely domestic political 
process. There was little international interest in the ballot, with only very few aid 
agencies, foreign journalists, or diplomats taking notice. By contrast, the local elections 
in Aceh were at the center of an internationally negotiated peace agreement, attracting 
intense attention from donors, foreign governments, reporters, and academics. This 
discrepancy in international involvement in Papua and Aceh reflected different 
perceptions of the two conflict areas both abroad and in Jakarta. First of all, the 
separatist movement in Aceh was much better organized than its counterpart in Papua 
and had long posed a significantly bigger threat to the central government. Since the 
early 1950s, several waves of armed conflict had seriously undermined Jakarta's 
authority over the province, with Acehnese leaders demanding more political rights 
and a fairer distribution of Aceh's rich natural resources. In the most recent of these 
waves, the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, had since 1976 fought for independence 
from Indonesia, launching substantial guerrilla campaigns against Jakarta's troops. 
After Suharto's downfall, it had even temporarily controlled about "70 to 80 percent" 
of Aceh's territory.66 Approximately ten thousand people had died in the separatist 
war, and many more had fled to neighboring countries—most often Malaysia. Even 
several years after the end of the New Order, the intensity of the conflict had showed 
no sign of fading—until the tsunami of December 2004 brought most of the combat 
activities to a halt.
The OPM in Papua, on the other hand, had been a highly disorganized assembly of 
local resistance groups, which often counted less than a dozen members each. The 
challenge posed by their military powers was negligible for Jakarta, and most foreign 
governments—except for Australia and some Pacific nations—did not consider Papua 
a serious problem for their regional security interests. In addition, after the fall of 
Suharto, the character of the human rights violations committed by the armed forces in 
Papua had gradually changed from the systematic atrocities prevalent during the 1970s 
and 1980s to a regime of "chronic low-level abuse," which was less closely scrutinized 
by international observers.67 Particularly after 2003, there have been very few incidents 
in Papua that could be classified as gross and systematic violations of human rights. In 
Aceh, on the other hand, the central government had launched an all-out military 
campaign against GAM in May 2003, following the collapse of a "cessation of 
hostilities agreement" negotiated in late 2002 under the auspices of the Switzerland- 
based Henry Dunant Centre (HDC). The difference between the high levels of
66 Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, Policy Studies 2 
(Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, 2004), p. viii.
67 International Crisis Group, Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing No. 53,
(Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006), p. 1.
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international attention to Aceh and the global indifference to Papua widened even 
further after the humanitarian intervention triggered by the tsunami swept a large 
number of foreign aid agencies into Aceh. In the words of one aid official, the rapid 
and massive arrival of foreigners in previously tightly controlled Aceh turned the 
province from "North Korea into Woodstock" in a matter of days.68 The multi-billion- 
dollar reconstruction programs forced Indonesia to open up Aceh to foreign militaries, 
aid workers, and journalists, subjecting the province to an unprecedented level of 
scrutiny. At the same time, however, the central government grew increasingly 
nervous about Papua. Trying to avoid a level of internationalization similar to that in 
Aceh, it implemented restrictions that made it increasingly difficult for foreigners to 
gain entry into Papua.
Despite the divergent levels of international engagement, the elections in Papua 
and Aceh also featured significant similarities. In both provinces, new provisions for 
local elections had been enshrined in their 2001 special autonomy laws, but in neither 
region were such elections held in the period between 2001 and 2005. This was due to 
the intentional ambiguities in the laws, delaying tactics by the central government, and 
internal power struggles in both regions. The special autonomy law for Aceh had gone 
even further than the legislation on Papua— it theoretically opened the door for direct 
elections of the governor, district heads, and mayors at a time when no such regulation 
was under discussion at the national level. Similar to the developments in Papua, 
however, the governor of Aceh had been elected only one year earlier for a five-year 
term, using the old electoral framework. In that ballot, Abdullah Puteh had won a 
large majority in the provincial legislature, and after the special autonomy law was 
enacted, Puteh insisted that he be allowed to serve out his term before the new direct 
mechanism could be applied. In 2002, he even suggested that no popular ballot could 
be held before 2010.69 Trying to prevent any moves towards direct elections, the 
incumbent governor exerted continuous pressure on the local parliament to delay the 
drafting of the implementing regulations, or qanun, for the direct polls.
However, weakened by ongoing corruption investigations, which led to his arrest 
and imprisonment in November 2004, Puteh was unable to hold up the drafting 
process. In early 2004, the Acehnese parliament passed a qanun on the local elections, 
which regulated some of the details left out in the 2001 Law. Most importantly, the 
qanun introduced the possibility of independent, non-party candidates participating in 
the elections, something the central government expressed serious concerns about.70 
Jakarta officials argued in November 2004, shortly after Susilo's inauguration, that the 
qanun stood in open contradiction to the new Law on Local Government, which 
regulated the direct elections of governors, district heads, and mayors all across 
Indonesia, and which did not allow for non-party nominees. The issue was about to 
develop into one of the most serious tests in the relationship between Aceh—now led 
by Puteh's deputy, Azwar Abubakar—and the central government, when the 
devastating tsunami of December 2004 turned Aceh's world upside down.
68 "Tsunami Response Offers Lessons for Islamabad," Financial Times, October 12, 2005.
69 "37 Anggota DPRD NAD Dukung Pilsung Kepala Daerah," Radio Nikoya Banda Aceh, August 16, 2002.
70 "Pilkada Langsung di Aceh Buka Peluang Calon Independen," Kompas, November 10, 2004.
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Trauma and Peace: From the Tsunami to Helsinki
The tsunami hit Aceh more than eighteen months after the Megawati government 
had launched its full-blown military campaign against the separatist rebels. During the 
war, the Indonesian side had managed to push the guerrillas back into the mountains, 
where GAM was no longer able to maintain its widespread network of effective 
taxation. Cut off from its funding base, GAM leaders had throughout 2004 
reconsidered their strategy, and many within the organization believed that a new 
approach was necessary.71 Thus, when the Indonesian government, through Vice- 
President Kalla, delivered an offer to start up fresh negotiations in late 2004, GAM 
agreed. It was in this period of renewed contacts that the tsunami suddenly struck, 
exerting a catalyzing effect on the efforts to reach a political settlement of the conflict. 
Pressured by international donors to suspend hostilities to allow for Aceh's 
undisturbed reconstruction, representatives of the Susilo government and GAM met in 
Helsinki in February 2005 for peace negotiations. In what Edward Aspinall described 
as a "shift of historic proportions,"72 GAM for the first time indicated that it was 
prepared to accept "self-government" within the Indonesian republic instead of 
independence. In this context, the local elections became a crucial issue. Given the 
ongoing negotiations and the extent of the destruction inflicted by the tsunami, it 
seemed impossible to hold elections by October 2005, the schedule required by 
Indonesian law. Both GAM and Susilo's negotiators therefore began to view the 
elections as part of the peace process, with each side lobbying for concessions from the 
other. GAM demanded that it be granted the right to form a local political party to 
participate in the 2009 legislative elections, and prior to that, to field independent 
candidates in the upcoming gubernatorial and district ballots.73 The Indonesian 
government initially rejected both proposals, saying that they "contradicted" the 
constitution.74 Instead, it offered to let GAM use existing national parties to nominate 
its candidates.
The disagreement over the terms of the elections almost caused the failure of the 
peace negotiations. Indonesia's refusal to allow local political parties and independent 
candidates angered the GAM negotiators, who viewed the concession as a conditio sine 
qua non for the settlement.75 Jakarta's representatives, on the other hand, held deep 
suspicions of GAM's political intentions, fearing that the rebel group might use the 
elections to achieve independence at the ballot box. In addition, mindful of Habibie's
71 Damien Kingsbury, Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account o f the Helsinki Peace Process (Jakarta and Singapore: 
Equinox Publishing, 2006), p. 20.
72 Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?, Policy Studies 20, 
(Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, 2005), p. 26.
73 Initially, GAM even requested that fresh legislative elections be held quickly after the signing of the 
peace accord, thus bringing forward the official schedule, which stipulated that the next elections had to 
take place in 2009. After it became clear, however, that this was an unrealistic demand (the only other time 
that Indonesian elections had been held earlier than originally scheduled in the last thirty-five years were 
the elections of 1999, which required a Special Session of the MPR), GAM asked for the opportunity to file 
independent candidates.
74 Ironically, Indonesia's Constitutional Court ruled in July 2007 that barring independent candidates from 
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tolerated, but in fact called for, the candidacy of independent candidates.
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failed reelection bid after the East Timor referendum in 1999, the central government 
was worried that handing too many concessions to GAM could deliver highly 
explosive campaign ammunition to Susilo's political opponents. At the end, however, 
the Indonesian government had to give in. When it turned out that GAM would walk 
away from the Helsinki negotiations if its demands for electoral participation were not 
met, Kalla allowed the Indonesian delegation to agree to the movement's requests.76 
Accordingly, the Helsinki peace accord signed in August 2005 included a stipulation 
that required the Indonesian executive and legislature to create the legal framework for 
local political parties in Aceh within eighteen months, and although it was not 
explicitly stated in the document, an understanding was reached that independent 
candidates would be able to participate in the elections for governor and district chiefs. 
The Indonesian government, for its part, announced that it would accommodate these 
changes to Aceh's electoral system in the new Law on the Governance of Aceh, which 
was widely seen as the centerpiece of the Helsinki agreement.
The failure of the Helsinki accord to regulate explicitly the issue of independent 
candidates offered conservative elements in the Jakarta government and legislature the 
opportunity to undermine GAM's preparations for the provincial and district polls. In 
the government draft for the Law on the Governance of Aceh, which was sent to 
parliament in February 2006, no mention was made of independent candidates, and 
senior officials once again suggested GAM could ask already established parties to 
nominate its leaders.77 Only after massive demonstrations in Aceh, and warnings from 
GAM that it viewed this move as a violation of the Helsinki agreement, did parliament 
decide in April that non-party candidates would be permitted to run in the upcoming 
elections.78 The regulation was limited to the 2006 ballot only, however, as lawmakers 
assumed that in subsequent elections GAM would be able to file candidates through its 
own political party. After the passing of the law in August 2006, the Acehnese 
parliament drafted a new qanun on the local elections that mostly reflected the qanun 
already passed in 2004 and another one issued in 2005. At that time, the central 
government had vetoed the paragraph allowing independent candidates to participate 
in the elections, but now the Law on the Governance of Aceh provided a clear legal 
foundation for the new electoral mechanism. The Acehnese legislature further decided 
that candidates for governor or district head had to collect signatures of support from 3 
percent of the population in their respective territories. It also defined, rather 
controversially, the ability to read the Qu'ran as one of the criteria determining 
whether a potential nominee was qualified to run.
The passing of the Law on the Governance of Aceh allowed the government to 
finally determine the date for Aceh's local elections. Given the lengthy process of 
verifying the numerous independent candidates, and various other logistical problems, 
voting day was set for December 11, 2006. Voter registration had already begun earlier 
in the year, supported by Germany's development organization GTZ (Gesellschaft fur 
Technische Zusammenarbeit, Association for Technical Cooperation).79 The United
76 Farid Husain, To See the Unseen: Kisah di Balik Damai di Aceh (Jakarta: Health&Hospital Indonesia, 2007), 
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77 "Wapres: Calon Independen Tak Ada Dalam MoU Helsinki," Kompas, February 5, 2006.
78 "Calon Independen Disepakati," Serambi, April 21, 2006.
79 "Kartu Pemilih, KIP Butuh Dua Hari," Serambi, November 28, 2006.
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Nation's Development Program established a special office in Aceh to provide 
assistance for the elections, working closely with Aceh's Independent Electoral 
Commission (Komisi Independen Pemilihan, KIP). Their efforts included public 
information campaigns, the training of election officials, and the difficult task of 
registering Aceh's more than 2.6 million voters, many of whom had become refugees 
after the tsunami and were constantly moving from one address to the next. In contrast 
to the situation in Papua, however, donors provided millions of dollars in assistance, 
turning Aceh's election into the local ballot with the biggest amount of external 
funding ever held in Indonesia. Therefore, despite the logistical challenges that 
prevailed in the aftermath of an unprecedented natural disaster, and the political 
sensitivities in play following decades of conflict, Aceh's gubernatorial and district 
elections were reasonably well managed, allowing the candidates and voters to focus 
on the electoral competition rather than the technical issues associated with it.
The field of candidates in Aceh's gubernatorial elections presented a highly 
heterogeneous mix between figures from Aceh's Indonesian elite and GAM-affiliated 
ex-rebels. As in many other Indonesian elections, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, retired 
security officers, party politicians, and civil society leaders entered the race for the 
governorship. Azwar Abubakar, the acting governor until late 2005, was considered 
one of the leading candidates, given his personal wealth and access to Aceh's 
bureaucratic apparatus. Besides being the provincial chairman of PAN (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, National Mandate Party), Azwar had also secured the support of the 
influential Islamic party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party). In 
exchange for its support, the former governor promised PKS that he would cover the 
costs of the campaign and accepted Nasir Djamil, a PKS legislator, as his running 
mate.80 One of Azwar's main competitors was Malik Raden, the former head of Aceh's 
education office and a member of Indonesia's Regional Representative Council (Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). Malik was a well-connected activist and bureaucrat, with 
links to religious, political, and sports groups.81 He was nominated by Golkar, whose 
chairman, Sayed Fuad Zakariah, ran as Malik's vice-gubernatorial nominee. Other 
candidates from the Indonesian political establishment included Djali Yusuf, Aceh's 
former military commander; Tamlicha Ali, another retired general; Iskandar Hoesin, a 
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, who had unsuccessfully run 
for the governorship in 2000; and Ghazali Abbas Adan, a former member of 
Indonesia's General Assembly, who had been a vocal critic of Indonesian rule in Aceh, 
but had refrained from officially joining GAM. Under normal circumstances, these 
candidates alone would have provided a broad variety of views and personalities, just 
as in other Indonesian local elections. But the ongoing peace process gave Aceh's 
elections a unique twist, with much of the public attention focused on GAM's internal 
debate about its nominees for the ballot.
80 Interview with Nasir Djamil, Jakarta, September 15, 2006.
81 Interview with Malik Raden, Banda Aceh, October 8, 2006.
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Conflict and Triumph: GAM's Political Transformation
As in Papua, the local elections were as much a test for the critics of Jakarta's 
policies as they were for the central government itself. In Papua, the elections had 
exposed not only deep dissatisfaction with Indonesian rule, but also significant social 
and political rifts among the indigenous population. In Aceh, similar processes were at 
work. Most importantly, the elections undercut the institutional solidity of GAM, 
which for decades had been able to withstand the superior military power of 
Indonesian troops largely because of its much-admired internal cohesion. Since the late 
1970s, the GAM leadership, exiled in Sweden, had maintained a remarkable degree of 
control over its field troops, with many local commanders accepting orders sent to 
them by phone or short-messaging service.82 By the same token, there had been no 
serious questioning of the Swedish exiles' right to determine GAM's strategy during 
the Helsinki talks, and field commanders meticulously followed their instructions 
when the details of the agreement were carried out. As the elections approached, 
however, this solidity suddenly crumbled. Serious divisions emerged, with younger 
district commanders openly challenging the authority of the old leadership in Sweden 
to decide GAM's approach to the upcoming ballot. The conflict resulted in the almost 
complete isolation of GAM's government-in-exile from the political process in Aceh 
itself, and facilitated the rise of a new class of GAM leaders, who are likely to take over 
the leadership of the organization in the years to come.
The two factions within GAM have given conflicting accounts of the reasons for 
this fragmentation. There is little doubt, however, that the imminent gubernatorial 
ballot contributed significantly to the escalation of tensions. The elections drew a clear 
line between the "old guard" in Sweden and the so-called "young Turks" on the 
ground in Aceh.83 The younger critics of Sweden's leadership included Irwandi Yusuf, 
an American-trained veterinarian who had been imprisoned on treason charges before 
becoming GAM's representative on the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), the body 
charged with overseeing the peace process; Muzakkir Manaf, the former supreme 
commander of GAM's troops in Aceh, who after August 2005 became the head of the 
GAM office for the demobilization and reintegration of its veterans, the KPA (Komisi 
Peralihan Aceh, Aceh's Transitional Committee); Muhammad Nazar, the extroverted 
chief of SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh, Information Center for a 
Referendum in Aceh), an association of formerly pro-independence students; Sofyan 
Dawood, a charismatic guerrilla leader who had often acted as spokesperson for the 
troops; and Bakhtiar Abdullah, GAM's international spokesman, who was the only 
senior Sweden-based figure who broke ranks with the exiled government. On the other 
side of the divide were Malik Mahmud, the prime minister of the cabinet-in-exile; 
Zaini Abdullah, GAM's foreign minister; Zaini's younger brother, Hasbi, who had 
been a marginal figure during the guerrilla struggle but who emerged as a favorite in 
the competition for GAM's gubernatorial nomination; and Zakaria Saman, GAM's 
defense minister and main arms procurer, who now headed the political section of the 
Majelis GAM, GAM's executive council.
82 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement, p. 13.
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Naturally, both sides blamed the other for the escalating tensions. Irwandi asserted 
that Malik had committed several blunders during the peace process, among others by 
allowing Indonesia to maintain a large number of security troops in the province.84 
More importantly, however, Irwandi suggested that Malik had failed to live up to his 
promise of democratizing GAM's hierarchical political structures. In particular, 
Irwandi's supporters referred to a meeting in Stockholm in early 2006, during which 
Malik had allegedly pledged that GAM's candidate for the gubernatorial elections 
would be determined through a strictly democratic process.85 In their view, this stood 
in open contrast to Malik's persistent promotion of Hasbi Abdullah as GAM's 
candidate for the upcoming ballot. Even after a specially convened GAM congress in 
May 2006 resulted in the gubernatorial nomination of Nashruddin bin Ahmed, a 
former GAM negotiator, Malik continued to work for Hasbi's candidacy. When 
Nashruddin suddenly declined the nomination, the young Turks consequently claimed 
that he had done so after strong pressure from Malik's circle.86
Following Nashruddin's withdrawal, Irwandi and his supporters demanded that a 
new vote on the nomination be held, and they were certain that they had the numbers 
to win the contest. Malik, however, insisted that Hasbi ought to be the GAM candidate 
since he had come in second, after Nashruddin, in the May congress. Unable to reach 
an agreement with his opponents, Malik finally declared that GAM would not send an 
officially endorsed candidate into the race, but would allow its members to stand 
individually.87 As a result, Hasbi teamed up with Humam Hamid, a sociologist and 
activist nominated by the Islamic party PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United 
Development Party).88 Hasbi even agreed to run only as Humam's deputy, further 
fueling the anger of Irwandi's group, which viewed this move as a betrayal of GAM's 
decades-long struggle. Determined not to support Hasbi's campaign, Irwandi declared 
that "we did not fight for thirty years to help the candidate of a Jakarta-based party to 
win the governorship."89
The old guard around Malik, on the other hand, believed that Irwandi's approach 
had the potential of damaging the still volatile peace process. Not only were they 
uncertain about GAM's chances of winning the governorship single-handedly, they 
also thought that an exclusive GAM nomination could play into the hands of 
hardliners in the Indonesian political establishment who continued to lobby against the 
Helsinki accord. "It is much better to bridge the differences between GAM and the 
Indonesians by a joint candidacy—both sides will win, nobody loses," explained Hasbi 
Abdullah.90 Malik viewed Humam Hamid as an ideal partner—he had close links with 
Indonesian bureaucrats and military figures, but was untainted by the corruption of
84 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, October 9, 2006.
85 Interview with Muhammad Nazar, Banda Aceh, October 9, 2006.
86 Ibid.
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previous Acehnese administrations. Under his potential governorship, GAM could 
learn its way in political and administrative affairs, place some of its leaders in key 
bureaucratic positions, and prepare the organization for the 2009 legislative elections. 
This evolutionary concept, Malik believed, suited GAM better than their opponents' 
radical strategy, which intended to take over the provincial administration for GAM 
and, as Irwandi put it, "rock the boat a bit."91 In addition to these paradigmatic 
differences, the Swedish leadership also viewed Irwandi as an uncontrollable and 
unreliable cadre: according to Hasbi, GAM officials had asked Irwandi several times if 
he intended to run for the governorship, to which the latter allegedly replied that he 
had no such plans.92 Thus Malik's circle was outraged when Irwandi announced his 
candidacy as an independent nominee in August 2006, with Muhammad Nazar as his 
running mate.93 The lingering conflict between the two camps had finally come into the 
open.
Initially, it appeared as if the split within GAM had seriously damaged its electoral 
prospects. With two GAM-affiliated pairs in the race, and several well-connected and 
affluent competitors from the Indonesian establishment running high-profile 
campaigns, GAM officials began to prepare for a possible defeat. In interviews, 
members of both camps stressed that an electoral loss would be acceptable, and that 
GAM's real goal was to transform itself into a political party and to dominate the 
provincial legislature through the 2009 elections.94 Several opinion surveys seemed to 
confirm this trend: two national pollsters, who had an excellent track record in 
predicting the outcome of local elections in the past, showed Azwar Abubakar and 
Malik Raden as the leading candidates.95 Another poll by an international survey 
institute one week before the elections saw Humam and Hasbi slightly ahead, but still 
far from overcoming the 25 percent threshold needed for an outright win. In the same 
poll, Irwandi stood at 7 percent, in fourth place.96
Developments on the ground pointed in a different direction, however. Defying the 
unfavorable poll numbers, Irwandi gradually emerged as the only candidate who 
could credibly represent GAM's anti-establishment, populist, and ethno-nationalist 
agenda. There were several reasons for this. First of all, Irwandi had taken control of 
the GAM network, winning the support of almost all field commanders. Muzakkir 
Manaf, who had initially been forced by Malik Mahmud to support Humam and 
Hasbi, withdrew this backing at the beginning of the campaign in late November 2006, 
sending a clear signal to his subordinates that they were not obliged to mobilize the
91 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, October 9, 2006.
92 Interview with Hasbi Abdullah, Banda Aceh, October 8, 2006.
93 "Pasangan Irwandi-Nazar Dideklarasikan," Acehkita, August 27, 2006.
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95 Interviews with Sayed Fuad Zakariah, Jakarta, November 16, 2006; and Saiful Mujani, head of the 
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obtained the figures from a source involved in organizing the survey.
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Table 2: Results of the 2006 Gubernatorial Election in Aceh
No. N a m e s  o f  
Ca n d id a t e s
V o t es Pe r c e n t a g e Pa r t y
A f f il ia t io n /In d e p e n d e n t
1 Irwandi Yusuf —  
Muhammad Nazar
768.745 38.2 % Independent
2 Ahmad Humam 
Hamid — Hasbi 
Abdullah
334.484 16.6 % PPP
3 Malik Raden —  
Sayed Fuad Zakaria
281.174 13.9 % Golkar, PDI-P, and others
4 Azwar Abubakar —  
Nasir Djamil
213.566 10.6 % PAN, PKS
5 Ghazali Abbas 




6 ISKANDAR HOESIN —
S at .eh Manaf
111.553 5.5% Coalition of small parties
7 Tamlicha Ali —  
Harmen Nuriqmar
80.327 3.9% Coalition of small parties




population for Sweden's nominee.97 Irwandi, who as a senior figure in the AMM and 
KPA had managed the economic reintegration programs for former GAM fighters, was 
hugely popular among the field troops, outclassing the aging and uncharismatic 
Hasbi.98 In the same vein, Nazar's SIRA apparatus proved invaluable in organizing 
urban activists for Irwandi's campaign. Moreover, Irwandi was the only candidate 
who spoke out against the deficiencies of the Law on the Governance of Aceh. While
97 "GAM Tarik Dukungan di Pilkada NAD," Suara Merdeka, November 28, 2006.
98 "Hope for Moderate in Aceh," The Australian, December 9, 2006.
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most other nominees played it safe by only raising the standard issues of economic 
development, education, and infrastructure, Irwandi pledged to push aggressively for 
changes to the law. Finally, most observers had underestimated the extent of Acehnese 
discontent with the Jakarta-connected provincial bureaucracy and the political class 
that ran it. Among previous governors, senior bureaucrats, and military figures, 
Irwandi stood out as the only candidate convincingly calling for radical change. The 
strategy of the Swedish leadership, which had tried a "soft" approach in order to avoid 
destabilizing the peace process and to adapt GAM slowly to the new political 
framework, was failing.
Irwandi's eventual victory in the elections—with a staggering 38.2 percent of the 
votes—shocked the Indonesian authorities as much as experienced political analysts. 
With a gap of more than 20 percent between the winner and the second-placed pair 
Humam and Hasbi, the political "avalanche"99 was so overwhelming that none of 
Irwandi's opponents filed electoral complaints with the courts—almost a routine in 
other Indonesian provinces. Apparently, most Acehnese voters had not stated their 
preferences accurately to the survey institutions and had waited until election day to 
make their choice known. While it has still not been scientifically established why the 
opinion polls were so far off the mark, one Acehnese observer offered his personal 
interpretation of this phenomenon. Based on his own observations, he speculated that 
many villagers had been suspicious when the pollsters came to their houses, fearing 
that the Indonesian government would register them as GAM members if they 
declared their support for Irwandi. Thus, according to this observer, most Acehnese 
had kept their political leanings secret until they went to the ballot box.100
Despite the shock, however, the Indonesian government displayed no public signs 
of irritation, for the time being at least. Susilo instructed his military leaders and 
cabinet members to express their unambiguous acceptance of the election results, and, 
in an unprecedented move, the president in January 2007 even welcomed Irwandi and 
Nazar in the state palace before their inauguration, something he had not done with 
any other governors-elect.101 If the Indonesian government gave a controlled response 
to the election outcome, Irwandi tried to echo it accordingly. Addressing widespread 
concerns that he and his deputy continued to harbor separatist sentiments, Irwandi 
asserted that the question of Aceh's place in the Indonesian republic had been settled 
once and for all in Helsinki. He promised to cooperate effectively with the provincial 
legislature controlled by national parties and said that he would not "cleanse" the 
bureaucracy of anti-GAM incumbents.102 Nevertheless, Irwandi insisted that he would 
use his governorship to "test how far the Indonesian government is prepared to go in 
granting Aceh real and effective autonomy."103 So far, the result of this test is still 
pending.
99 SMS communication with Irwandi Yusuf, December 11, 2006.
100 Phone interview with Rizal Sukma, December 11, 2006.
101 "SBY Tak Khawatir Aceh Merdeka," Jawa Pos, December 13, 2006; "SBY Endorses Irwandi Leadership," 
Jakarta Post, January 12, 2007.
102 "Wawancara dengan Calon Gubernur NAD Irwandi Yusuf," Jawa Pos, December 13, 2006.
103 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, October 9, 2006.
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Regional and Ethnic Divisions: The Problem of Acehnese Identity
Irwandi's victory was resounding, and there could be no doubt that it constituted a 
victory for GAM as a whole. But the elections had also exhibited significant divisions 
within GAM and Acehnese society, posing difficult challenges for Irwandi's rule. In 
terms of GAM's internal affairs, the electoral win followed a process of deep 
fragmentation. The once solidly united organization split into two major camps, a 
process that affected its potential to act as a coherent political group. Most importantly, 
the two factions did not reconcile after the polls, with the relationship between Malik 
and Irwandi remaining fragile at best. As GAM transforms itself into a political party 
and prepares for the 2009 elections, these divisions are unlikely to improve its political 
standing. From the perspective of the Indonesian government, however, GAM's 
internal power struggles were not without merits. These conflicts absorbed much of 
GAM's political attention and energy,104 shifting its focus from anti-Jakarta rhetoric to 
issues of organizational consolidation and domestic governance in Aceh. In the longer 
term, this shift has the potential to alleviate secessionist demands within GAM and the 
Acehnese community in general.
Besides eroding GAM's institutional coherence, the ballot also further questioned 
the concept of a united Acehnese identity. Far from being a homogeneous ethnic and 
social entity, Aceh consists of numerous, highly diverse groups, whose conflicting 
political choices were clearly visible in the election results. Irwandi had won in fifteen 
out of Aceh's twenty-one districts and municipalities, and GAM had taken the 
positions of bupati or mayor in Sabang, Pidie, Lhosksomawe, Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, 
Aceh Barat, Aceh Jaya, and, in another election in June 2007, Bireuen. These were 
mostly areas in which ethnic Acehnese, who make up around 70 percent of the 
population of the province, constituted the dominating social constituency. But while 
they won convincing victories in GAM's strongholds, Irwandi and local GAM 
candidates lost in many of the central and southeastern districts where ethnic non- 
Acehnese, like Gayo, Javanese, Alas, Aneuk Jamee, and Tamiang, formed the majority 
of the population.105 In those areas, nominees filed by national political parties mostly 
won the local elections, with Golkar taking six and coalitions between other parties 
obtaining five district head positions.106 In the years preceding the Helsinki agreement, 
anti-GAM militias had concentrated their activities in such ethnic non-Acehnese 
territories, supporting the military in its campaigns against the rebels. While the 
influence of the militias declined significantly after the peace process began, the
104 Michael Morfit, "Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Agreement was Possible in August 
2005," paper prepared for the International Conference, "Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One Year 
After the Helsinki Accord," Jakarta, Indonesian Council for World Affairs, 2006, p. 25.
105 Irwandi lost in Aceh Tengah, Aceh Timiang, Aceh Singkil, and Bener Meriah to candidates from the 
Indonesian establishment, and was beaten by Humam and Hasbi in Pidie and Banda Aceh due to internal 
GAM splits. Generally, the share of votes for GAM candidates was much lower in the central and 
southeastern districts than in the northeast and southwest. In North Aceh, Irwandi gained 60.6 percent of 
the votes; in Bireuen (his home district), 62.1 percent; in East Aceh, 48.7 percent; in South Aceh, 62.4 
percent; in Aceh Barat Daya, 49.8 percent; and in Aceh Jaya even 70.8 percent. In Aceh Timiang, on the 
other hand, he only gained 19.4 percent; in Bener Meriah, 17.5 percent; in Aceh Tengah, 13.9 percent; and 
in Aceh Singkil, 11.1 percent.
106 In Bener Meriah, for example, there are about 60 percent ethnic Gayo, 20 percent Javanese, and 20 
percent Acehnese. A Golkar candidate won the race there, and, as stated above, it was one of the few areas 
that Irwandi could not win. See International Crisis Group, "Aceh's Local Elections," p. 12.
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elections once again pointed to the deep divide between Aceh's ethnic heartland in the 
Northeast, which heavily supported GAM and its political goals, and the culturally 
diverse districts at the margins, which traditionally favored continued inclusion in the 
Indonesian republic.
As in Papua, the ethnic and regional cleavages in Aceh were reflected in demands 
for the establishment of separate provinces. Key politicians from Aceh Tengah, Aceh 
Tenggara, Aceh Singkil, Gayo Lues, and Bener Meriah have called for the creation of 
"Aceh Leuser Antara" (ALA), while senior leaders in Aceh Barat, Aceh Barat Daya, 
Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, and Simeulue have proposed to establish the new province of 
"Aceh Barat Selatan" (ABAS). Launched in 2001, the initiatives for the two new 
provinces immediately drew suspicions of having been engineered by the armed forces 
or the intelligence apparatus in order to weaken the pro-independence movement.107 
But just as in Papua, the involvement of the security forces tainted what otherwise 
appeared to be a genuine sentiment against control by the capital of Banda Aceh and 
its largely ethnic Acehnese elite. After 2005, the peace process catalyzed the two 
initiatives, with leaders of both groups trying to capitalize on the radical change going 
on in the province.108 GAM, however, managed to include a guarantee on the borders 
of Aceh in the Helsinki accord, fixing the boundaries in their 1956 format.109 Against 
the protests from ALA and ABAS activists, the central government assured GAM that 
it would honor the borders as stipulated in the agreement—for the time being. The 
election results, on the other hand, are likely to boost the campaign of at least the ALA 
leaders: in none of the districts participating in the ALA initiative did a GAM 
candidate win the post of bupati, and Irwandi's electoral performance there was much 
weaker than in the ethnic Acehnese areas. It is possible that ALA and ABAS 
protagonists will revive their campaign under Irwandi's rule as governor, particularly 
if the latter drives a confrontational course against Jakarta. The central government, for 
its part, could also use the ALA and ABAS initiatives as issues to turn against Irwandi 
should the governor make good on his pledge to "rock the boat."
Election Aftermath: GAM's Entrenchment in the Political Infrastructure
In regards to the risk that newly elected leaders in autonomous regions could use 
their fresh resources to lobby against the unitary state, Irwandi's rise to power 
presented the central government with a significantly greater challenge than Suebu's 
election in Papua. Several reasons accounted for this difference. To begin with, while 
Suebu had obtained the governorship, he had no independent political network that 
could back up his work in the provincial administration with grassroots mobilization 
and advocacy operations. Despite his close relationship with Golkar and PDI-P 
politicians, he was not in control of either party. Moreover, the Papua branches of
107 "Tak Terakomodasi dalam RUU NAD: Tiga Kabupaten di Aceh Menuntut Propinsi Baru," Kompas, 
August 4, 2001.
108 There were significant differences in the intensity of the campaigns for ALA and ABAS, however. Most 
importantly, the initiative to create ALA was launched before the ABAS campaign got underway. 
Furthermore, while ALA activists organized noisy street protests in Jakarta after the Helsiniki accord in 
order to demand their own province, ABAS operators kept a much lower profile. See "Keputusan Ulama 
Perti, Penting Maknanya," Serambi, June 3, 2006.
109 "Pemekaran Propinsi Dinilai Melanggar MoU," Acehkita, December 5, 2006.
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Golkar and PDI-P reported to nationalist central leaderships in Jakarta, which were 
certain to reject any activities of the provincial administration that could be interpreted 
as direct or indirect support for pro-independence aspirations in Papua. In addition, 
Suebu was confronted with bupatis who had mostly been elected before he took office, 
leaving him with no personal loyalists in the top echelons of district-level 
governments. By contrast, Irwandi controlled large segments of GAM's military and 
political apparatus from the province down to the village level. This network 
continued to be available for him after the election, serving as an important political 
instrument to galvanize aspirations, spread information about policies, and prepare the 
field for their implementation. Most importantly, GAM candidates had won eight 
district head positions in Aceh's most populous areas, and with one prominent 
exception (Pidie), the new GAM bupatis were all Irwandi loyalists. Accordingly, 
Irwandi was much better positioned than his Papuan counterpart to entrench himself 
in the political infrastructure of the state and gain control over its resources.
Under Irwandi's rule, senior GAM figures gained important posts in his 
administration or used their connections to secure lucrative government contracts. In 
one prominent example, Nur Djuli, a key GAM leader in exile before 2005, was 
appointed head of the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA, Badan Reintegrasi Aceh) in 
2007. The BRA was in charge of channeling around 800 billion Rupiah (US$88.8 
million) to ex-combatants and victims of the conflict, with former GAM members being 
among the most generously compensated recipients.110 In addition, numerous ex-GAM 
fighters were given positions at the Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency 
(BRR, Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh), which managed the post-tsunami 
rebuilding efforts and reported expenditures of 7.8 trillion Rupiah (US$866 million) in 
2006 alone.111 However, the opportunity to hire GAM cadres for jobs in the 
bureaucracy was limited by Indonesian regulations that reserved certain positions to 
officials with a particular rank in the government hierarchy. Thus Irwandi often had to 
turn to university lecturers or bureaucrats who had not been members of the 
movement but were known for their pro-GAM sentiments in the past. Those former 
GAM leaders who could not be accommodated in the government or its various sub­
environments typically built up businesses and sought contracts from the 
administration. According to Edward Aspinall, "in virtually every region, they have 
established companies and cooperatives and transformed themselves into contractors 
or 'kontraktor.'"112 Most of these former GAM guerrillas "are active in the construction 
industry: building houses, public offices, roads, bridges, irrigations channels, and other 
infrastructure, and supplying sand, rocks, and other building materials."113 Overall, the 
entrenchment of former GAM elements in Aceh's political and economic system has 
become significantly deeper than anybody, including GAM itself, could have expected 
when the Heslinki accord was signed in 2005.
But GAM's penetration of formal political institutions and economic patronage 
networks was accompanied by negative side effects commonly associated with such
110 "Let Us Manage Aceh's Natural Resources, Say Local Leaders," The Jakarta Post, June 15, 2006.
111 BRR, "Realisasi Anggaran BRR Sebesar 7,8 Trilyun," press release, Banda Aceh, December 29, 2006.
112 Edward Aspinall, "Guerillas in Power," Inside Indonesia 90 (2007), online at 
http: / / www.insideindonesia.org, accessed on August 17, 2007.
113 Ibid.
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sudden ascensions to political power. Most significantly, the pre-election tensions 
within GAM continued under Irwandi's rule. In July 2007, the Malik faction in GAM 
announced the establishment of its new political party, Partai GAM. The party flag 
displayed GAM's old separatist symbol, outraging not only the central government, 
but also many GAM figures allied with Irwandi Yusuf. Feeling that they had not been 
sufficiently involved in the creation of the party, several senior GAM leaders stayed 
away from the inauguration ceremony and later expressed disappointment over the 
choice of the party symbol. With access to government resources and the future 
leadership of the former independence movement at stake, such intra-GAM cleavages 
are likely to mark Acehnese politics for years to come. Moreover, corruption now 
emerged as a serious issue for GAM. While Irwandi tried to portray his administration 
as an antipode to the corrupt Indonesian predecessor governments, GAM "itself is 
organized in a way which finds an easy fit with the patrimonialism which pervades 
Indonesia's polity and economy."114 Former GAM guerrillas competed for jobs, 
projects, privileges, government subsidies, and other benefits, and mostly expected 
that standards of transparency and meritocracy be suspended in their favor. This 
problem, which had the potential to damage GAM's reputation and undermine the 
effectiveness of governance as a whole, was compounded by widespread political and 
economic extortion committed by former GAM members. This "low-level intimidation 
and harassment"115 tainted what otherwise had been a successful process of integrating 
GAM into Indonesia's political framework.
Preliminary Conclusion: The Elections in Aceh - Whose Victory?
Similar to the elections in Papua, the Aceh ballot supplied valid arguments to both 
the supporters of autonomy regimes in heterogeneous states and those who believe 
that "ethnofederal solutions," which were "designed to mitigate centrifugal forces, 
instead may end up strengthening them."116 On the one hand, GAM's success has 
disappointed the central government, which had hoped that the Acehnese electorate 
would reward it for the generous autonomy concessions enshrined in the Helsinki 
accord. Instead, voters in Aceh expressed their rejection of the old power networks, 
rebuffing Acehnese politicians with close links to Jakarta and overwhelmingly 
supporting nominees associated with the former separatist movement. GAM, which 
less than two years earlier had still led an armed rebellion for Aceh's independence 
from Indonesia, now entrenched itself in the political institutions of its former enemy 
and gained access to the resources of the state. The ex-rebels controlled the 
governorship and eight district administrations in Aceh, obtaining political power to 
determine future policies and abundant resources to distribute jobs, subsidies, and 
state contracts among former combatants. Many officials in the central government 
and anti-GAM elements in Aceh were deeply concerned about this accumulation of 
power and resources in the former rebel movement. In a hearing at the national 
legislature in Jakarta in July 2007, a former leader of an anti-GAM militia in Aceh 
complained that "GAM already controls the government, they have entered the
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict, p. 7.
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system, they also can decide on policies; if they gain entry into the legislature in 2009, it 
is only a short step for them to propose a referendum."117 While these fears were most 
profound in the circles of conservative nationalists and former GAM opponents in 
Aceh, they also reflect a skeptical (and increasingly influential) stream in the scholarly 
literature on the possible drawbacks of autonomy regimes.
There are, however, equally strong indications that the elections in Aceh may, in 
the longer term, undermine secessionist sentiments in the province. In a public opinion 
survey held by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) around six 
weeks after the elections, 64 percent of respondents said that the relationship between 
Aceh and the central government had improved during the past year.118 Only 4 percent 
believed that it had deteriorated. An overwhelming majority—92 percent of 
Acehnese—was confident that the elections had been "mostly fair" or "completely" 
fair, a significant vote of confidence for the electoral procedures of a province with a 
long-established history of engineered ballots. In consequence, while the central 
government has not profited immediately from the introduction of competitive 
elections in Aceh, it may benefit in the future from the restored credibility of the 
electoral process in the eyes of ordinary Acehnese. This, in turn, may help to convince 
Acehnese citizens that the central government is, in fact, serious about offering wide- 
ranging and effective autonomy concessions to the conflict-ridden province.
In an additional trend that may weaken the separatist tendencies in Aceh, the 
elections put GAM under extreme pressure as an organization. With GAM now 
controlling the provincial administration, it will have to provide evidence that it can 
rule better than its predecessors. Many of the policy challenges of the coming years— 
from post-tsunami reconstruction and reintegration of veterans to restructuring the 
economy as the oil reserves dry up—have the potential to turn the electorate against 
GAM if it fails to handle them well. For example, the head of KIP, Muhammad Jaffar, 
stated that "it's time to give GAM the chance to administer Aceh, (but) if it turns out 
that they do not deliver, then we'll choose other leaders."119 Moreover, the internal 
fissures within GAM before and after the elections have raised doubts about its long­
term prospects as an effective and united political machine. Authors like Aguswandi 
have warned that GAM's failure to maintain unity may create splinter groups, as had 
happened with the MNLF in the Philippines or the Provisional IRA in Northern 
Ireland.120 While this could potentially trigger renewed low-intensity conflict, it may 
ultimately undercut GAM's claim to be the sole representative of Acehnese grievances 
and aspirations. Finally, the elections have also questioned the concept of Acehnese 
identity, which was previously defined by advocacy of a united Acehnese struggle 
against Indonesian repression. By contrast, the elections laid bare important cleavages 
between the ethnic Acehnese in GAM strongholds and marginalized non-Acehnese 
groups in the hinterland. These divisions will make it more difficult for GAM in the 
future to summon its version of Acehnese identity to oppose the central government. 
Aspinall, for example, convincingly argued that as GAM begins "running a
117 "2009, Eks GAM Kuasai Legislatif dan Eksekutif," Suara Merdeka, July 17, 2007.
118 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, "Public Opinion in Aceh after the Pilkada," findings 
from an IFES Survey, fieldwork dates: January 25 to February 4, 2007.
119 "Elections Provide Chance for Ex-Rebels to Rule Aceh," Jakarta Post, January 17, 2007.
120 Aguswandi, "GAM's Party Good for Aceh's Peace, Stability," Jakarta Post, July 17, 2007.
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government, rather than opposing one, it's possible that the heightened sense of 
Acehnese identity and grievance with Jakarta which underpinned the conflict will 
fade."121
Local Elections in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism?
Before assessing the impact of electoral democratization in Papua and Aceh on the 
level of secessionist sentiments in both provinces, it is important to discuss briefly the 
implementation of special autonomy laws in these regions before direct elections of 
local government heads were introduced in 2005. Both Papua and Aceh had been 
granted special autonomy status in 2001 without substantial concessions in terms of 
democratic rights and liberties. The indirect electoral mechanism for governors and 
district heads was effectively maintained, and local political parties or independent 
candidates were not allowed. Instead, the special autonomy laws in both provinces 
focused heavily on resource distribution and symbolic references to the cultural 
identity of the dominant religio-ethnic groups. In Papua, the MRP was offered to the 
indigenous population as a body of cultural representation, while Aceh experienced 
the gradual implementation of Islamic law. In retrospect, it is evident that none of 
these concessions managed to reduce the separatist attitudes in the societies of Papua 
and Aceh. If anything, the fact that the special autonomy packages did not include new 
democratic rights, and that their eventual implementation was half-hearted at best, 
probably helped to fuel secessionist tendencies in both provinces rather than mitigate 
them. The delay in the creation of the MRP and the split of Papua into two provinces 
enraged and united Papuans in their political opposition to the central government, 
and the continued military operations under special autonomy in Aceh consolidated 
the view among many Acehnese that the Indonesian capital was unlikely ever to 
change its repressive approach. Thus, contrary to Cunningham's findings that 
autonomy regimes in states with low levels of democratic development tend to be 
more successful in reducing separatist sentiments,122 it is rather obvious that the 
withholding of democratic concessions under the special autonomy legislations for 
Aceh and Papua between 2001 and 2005 failed to have any mitigating impact on the 
secessionist demands in both areas.
It is against this backdrop of the continuous failure of previous government 
approaches to Papua and Aceh that the current experiment with more democracy and 
expanded autonomy rights must be judged. By breaking with the security-oriented 
strategies of the past, the Indonesian government took a considerable risk, and it 
deserves credit for that. It was not only skeptical scholars like Brancati who suggested 
that political decentralization arrangements do not necessarily reduce secessionism, 
but actually have the potential to intensify separatist tendencies by "supplying groups 
at the regional level of government with the resources to engage in [...] 
secessionism."123 In fact, many conservative elements in Indonesia's parliament, 
executive, media, and even civil society warned of the same danger. More importantly,
121 Edward Aspinall, "Aceh: Elections and the Possibility of Peace," Australian Policy Forum: 06-37A, 
December 18, 2006.
122 Cunningham, "Evaluating the Success of Regional Autonomy Regimes," p. 17.
123 Brancati, "Decentralization," p. 652.
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developments during and after the elections in Papua and Aceh seemed to confirm 
some of these suspicions. In both cases, fierce critics of Indonesian rule in their 
territories won the governorship; in Aceh, the former independence movement even 
obtained eight district head positions in addition to the provincial top job. 
Subsequently, the new rulers entrenched themselves deeply in the political 
infrastructure of the state. Suebu in Papua used his newly acquired powers to launch 
his long-planned village development project, triggering accusations from his political 
foes that he was trying to shift government funds to the OPM. In Aceh, Irwandi 
appointed former GAM members to positions in both the BRR and BRA, with multi­
million dollar budgets under their control. While Jakarta's critics reaped the benefits 
from the democratic opening, there appeared to be no immediate downturn in the 
secessionist attitudes in Papua and Aceh. In Papua, the DAP congress in July 2007 was 
still dominated by demands for independence, and while many Acehnese believed that 
the relationship with the central government had improved, GAM's continued 
popularity was highlighted by its landslide victory in the district of Bireuen in June— 
six months after Irwandi had taken office.
But the ascension of central government critics to political power through 
democratic elections in Papua and Aceh was counterbalanced by trends that, in the 
long run, could potentially tone down demands for independence in both provinces. 
First of all, the ballots highlighted significant ethnic, political, and social divisions in 
the societies of Papua and Aceh. In Papua, residents of the central highlands 
challenged the political hegemony of the coastal areas, arguing that they were victims 
of systematic discrimination by the ethno-regional center in Jayapura. The Acehnese 
election result, on the other hand, pointed to stark differences between the ethnic 
Acehnese areas, mostly in the north and east of the province, and non-Acehnese 
districts in the central and southeastern parts. Accordingly, the elections helped to 
reinforce the point that neither province conformed to the standard of "ethno- 
territoriality." Ethno-territorial units are those autonomous regions that were 
"explicitly created as a homeland for an ethnic group,"124 allowing them to display 
such high levels of internal coherence that secession becomes a particularly attractive 
option. By contrast, Papua's internal splits and the presence of a large number of 
immigrants all across the province made the creation of such an ethno-territorial entity 
an almost impossible task. In the same vein, Aceh's now GAM-led government needed 
to be careful not to overemphasize its ethnic exclusivity, since that would most likely 
encourage new attempts by ALA and ABAS to create their own provinces.
In addition, the electoral victories of anti-Jakarta forces in both Papua and Aceh 
exposed these groups to high public expectations that they may find difficult to meet. 
In Aceh, large sections of the population had supported GAM for decades as the 
romanticized antithesis to the rule by established Indonesian forces. As Jakarta's 
fiercest adversary, GAM was seen as committed to fighting government corruption, 
misuse of power, and rampant human rights abuses. Not unexpectedly, the first half- 
year of GAM in government suggests that the movement itself is prone to the same 
kind of transgressions previously blamed on the Indonesian authorities, demonstrating 
the complexity of the governance issues now at hand. Some of GAM's internal post­
election fissures showed just how intense the performance pressure on the former
124 Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict, p. 6.
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rebels has become. In Papua, Barnabas Suebu is confronted with similar challenges. 
During the campaign, he promised to distribute development funds directly to the 
villages, thus circumventing the notoriously corrupt bureaucracy. While he has 
launched the program in 2007, it is still unclear if it will achieve its goal of empowering 
poor Papuans at the grassroots level. Some Papuan civil society leaders have already 
criticized the project, saying it will encourage consumptive spending rather than 
support sustainable development.125 The central government, despite its irritations 
over the defeat of the candidates linked with it, will observe with interest (and in some 
cases, no doubt, schadenfreude) the manner in which the new Papuan and Acehnese 
administrations deal with these immense expectations.
The increased credibility of the electoral process in Papua and Aceh was another 
factor that supported the view that "a self-governing intra-state region—as a conflict­
solving mechanism in an internal armed conflict—is both a theoretical and, very often, 
a practical option for the parties in such conflicts."126 The victories of declared 
opponents of the central government in both autonomous regions provided the 
electoral system with an extent of public acceptance that many skeptics had deemed 
impossible for areas that had suffered from such notoriously high levels of political 
intervention and manipulation in the past. While the triumph of anti-Jakarta figures 
initially shocked the central government, it arguably did more to improve the latter's 
reputation in both territories than a possible win of pro-establishment figures would 
have achieved. By allowing its critics to assume executive responsibilities in Papua and 
Aceh, the Indonesian center finally delivered a signal that it was serious about granting 
substantial autonomy rights to its politically most sensitive provinces—something it 
had been reluctant to do in the past, with disastrous consequences for its image in both 
Papua and Aceh.
While this article has largely focused on the particular circumstances of local 
elections in Indonesia's autonomous provinces of Papua and Aceh, it has also pointed 
to a number of trends visible in other ballots across Indonesia. Most importantly, the 
role of political parties was extremely limited. In Aceh, independent candidates 
supported by GAM defeated the nominees filed by the largest political parties, which 
were mostly seen as members of corrupt and unresponsive "cartels."127 In Papua, 
Barnabas Suebu was nominated by PDI-P, but ran an independent campaign 
organized by a professional consulting firm. This reflected a general trend in 
Indonesia's local elections, where affluent non-party figures purchased nominations 
from cash-strapped parties, but ran their campaigns largely without the latter's 
involvement. The weakness of the parties paved the way for personality-driven 
elections, with charisma, financial resources, and popularity substituting for policy- 
oriented, party-dominated campaigning. Ultimately, the ballots in Papua and Aceh 
provided further evidence for a phenomenon that had emerged from the around 330 
local elections held in Indonesia between 2005 and 2007: the indispensability of
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effective grassroots networks for electoral success. GAM had a formidable network of 
former fighters spread throughout the villages, who mobilized voters for Irwandi and 
other GAM candidates on the ground. Barnabas Suebu, for his part, profited from his 
informal connections with bureaucrats, teachers, priests, and activists at the grassroots 
level—most of whom he had groomed during his first term as governor in the 1980s. 
The triumph of grassroots appeal over institutional party politics has facilitated the rise 
of independent political operators as major players in Indonesia's local affairs, and the 
established parties are well advised to draw their conclusions from this trend if they 
don't want to be overrun by it.
